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Chapter 1
Introduction
When Columbus lost his head
In June 2020, demonstrators marched in the UK in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter
demonstrations ongoing in the US. A group of demonstrators in Bristol brought down
and dumped in the river the statue of Edward Colston who was involved in the slave
trade in the 17th century.
In the German language, a distinction is drawn between Denkmal – which is a monument
and Mahnmal – which is a structure memorialising a painful chapter in history which
serves as a reminder that such history must not be repeated.
The uproar surrounding events in Bristol saw much discussion around the life and legacy
of Colston. But long after the controversy has blown over, the question that will remain
with us is this: What does heritage stand for and why it matters so much to us? Those
who oppose the toppling of the statue condemn such actions as erasure of history and
those that support its removal decry it as an affront to those at the receiving end of
historical injustice and marginalisation. Both parties agree that the statue – in both
standing there for 125 years and in no longer – serves the purpose of educating future
generations. Referring to similar takedowns of statues in cities across the United States,
one commentator viewed the events as “protest against the current neoliberal policies
that simultaneously expel the lower classes from urban centers, and transform them into
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frozen vestiges. The symbols of old slavery and colonialism are combined with the
dazzling visage of real estate capitalism — and these are the protestors’ targets”1.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes these events as statues leaping from the past into
our present. He perceives the attacks against them as an expression of discontent
against “unjust power (which) favors the rise of racism, the negation of other stories,
violence against women, and homophobia”2. The answer, for Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, lies in a creative liberation pedagogy, based on a recognition that the oppressor
too now seeks liberation.
The artist Banksy came forward to propose a compromise: Reinstate the Colston statue
to its plinth at an angle with the addition of tugging protestors on the ground having
halfway uprooted it.
Some debating the issue have taken a different angle: should the removal of the statue
have proceeded in a more orderly manner rather than what can now be considered
unlawful destruction of public property? The charged polemics of the episode directly
confront politics – domestic and international – with this question: Should order always
be privileged over justice?

****

1

Traverso E (2020), Bringing Down Statues Doesn’t Erase History, It Makes Us See It More Clearly, THEWIRE.IN
https://thewire.in/world/statues-racism-history-protests
Accessed June 27, 2020
2
De Sousa Santos B (2020), The Statues of our Discontent, Critical Legal Thinking website
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2020/06/20/the-statues-of-our-discontent/
Accessed June 23, 2020
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US withdrawal from UNESCO
Recognising the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, which was active
in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, as the precursor to UNESCO, Lynn Meskell
characterises the latter as “embedded within modernist principles of progress and
development and similarly subscribes to the liberal principles of diplomacy, tolerance,
and development”3. The role of international organisations is a key consideration in this
study and UNESCO is heavily focused on in this regard, due to its mission in the field of
heritage.
In 2017, the United States of America withdrew completely from UNESCO, having
discontinued funding to the organisation since 2011. Israel also withdrew from UNESCO
along with the US in an instance of what the realists would term bandwagoning. A major
concern for both countries is reported to have been the recognition of Palestine as a full
member state and designation of certain sites as Palestinian heritage.
In 2018, the United States withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council and
in 2020 from the World Health Organisation.
****
Post-COVID world order and international cooperation
Ten questions worth asking:
1. Who will be the winners and losers in international society?
2. Will a world order centred around one hegemonic power cease to exist?
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Meskell L (2013), UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40 Challenging the Economic and Political Order of
International Heritage Conservation, Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 4, p484
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3. Will another hegemon emerge and engage in revisionism and what toll will such a
transition exact?
4. Which aspects of history will be contested and resuscitated for forging of
identities and articulation of political agendas?
5. How will powerful groups respond to challenges to their privilege?
6. How will the global economy adapt and will neoliberalism decline?
7. Will international organisations reform themselves or recede irredeemably?
8. Will conventional geostrategic rivalries be heightened or supressed by the impact
of climate change?
9. What is the nature of preparedness required to cope with the psychosocial fallout
of conflict and uncertain technological change?
10. Can we keep teaching globalisation and other foundational concepts in social
science, law and international politics the way we have been? Have disciplinary
silos been rendered completely irrelevant, even counterproductive?
****
Memory in Law
The concept of memory in law has mainly been interpreted as a psychosocial concept in
the courtroom setting. Legal scholars, other than criminologists, have seldom found it
necessary to unpack the phenomenon of memory. In the literature surveyed for this
study, I was able to find one study which links memory and law towards analysing the
impact of the latter on preventing mass atrocities. The authors Joachim J Savelsberg and
Ryan D King propose two hypotheses in this context: first, “once established through
trials and other mechanisms, collective memory may counteract violence directly, by
6

delegitimising grave human rights violations, or indirectly, by evoking new control
responses” and second, “the narrative history produced by trials is unique in that it
reflects the institutional logic of the legal sphere”4. This study rescues memory from
cooption into this institutional logic of the legal sphere in two ways: first, through an
exploration of the way in which memory is embodied and enacted in heritage we have a
way to understand it anew; second, by observing how memory itself can fuel the conflict
which law seeks to redress, particularly when it manifests itself as intergenerational
trauma.
****
The Marble that saved the Mausoleum
The story of an attempted sale of the Taj Mahal by Governor General Lord Bentinck in the
early 1830s has survived the inherited lore from British India. The demolition of several
structures in Agra to repurpose their materials for construction of buildings of the
imperial administration is well established. As to whether the Taj Mahal itself was under
any serious threat of meeting a similar fate remains a matter of dispute5. Contemporary
writings suggest that the demolition did not go through as the marble in which the Taj
Mahal is constructed, failed to fetch an attractive price.
Today, the Taj is a World Heritage Site attracting millions of visitors each year and is also
visited by controversy stemming from communalisation and politicisation of heritage

4

Savelsberg JJ and King RD (2011), American Memories: Atrocities and the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, pp 8-

9
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In Spear P. (1949), Bentinck and the Taj, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
No. 2, pp. 180-187 evidence in support of both sides of the debate is examined.
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from time to time. However, this saga contains key lessons. Firstly, it is difficult to define
heritage because what is a masterpiece to someone is a mere hunk of marble to another.
Secondly, heritage is both unifying as a link to the past and polarising for its economic
and identity-related aspects. And thirdly, studying heritage is an exercise in mindfulness
and reflexivity because what we regard as cultural patrimony and how we approach it is
a reflection of our history and how much power we are accustomed to wielding.
****
Other ways of knowing as heritage
In “Internationalising the University: A Spiritual Approach”, I arrive at a conception of
“other ways of knowing” by observing through time, the dance between religion,
spirituality, science and knowledge creation. The separation of state and church was
accompanied by secularisation of science and education which I argue led to a “double
reductionism”6:
On the one hand, scientific modernity reduced the aim of salvation of the soul to constructs
such as human rights and liberal democracy. On the other, for the religious domain too, a
reductionist response was evoked, faced with a challenge to its universal applicability.
The concept of heritage is central to this study. As detailed later, the concept of heritage
opens the door for a conversation with other ways of knowing besides positivist, Eurocentric, hegemonic science, chiefly by reminding us that “while it may be possible to
explain the living human state entirely in scientific (biological) terms, it is our cultural

6

Unkule K (2019), Internationalising the University: A Spiritual Approach, Palgrave Macmillan, p 101
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inheritance that enables us to find meaning in our existence and not merely exist, but
thrive”7.
As a scholar situated in the global south, I consider other ways of knowing as part of my
heritage. This perspective has helped me to be, as a person, in sync with my scholarship.
With its growing influence on my teaching philosophy, this perspective has also enabled
me to better connect with students and begin to reimagine my role in legal education as
an outsider, a social scientist.
****
This doctoral study brings the disciplines of International Relations and International Law
together. While referring to the disciplines I have used capital I-R and I-L, while referring
to the real world phenomena, I have used small i-r and i-l. The main aim of this study is to
discover how the two disciplines, in conjunction, extend each other’s boundaries and
open the way for a shift of focus from order to justice in international society. The case
study I have used to delve into my research questions is that of protection of cultural
heritage. Heritage is treated here as a site for interdisciplinary study and the central
theme that draws in all the influences and strands of my research project. Accordingly, it
is a site for meeting of interests and identities, of theory and practice, of International
Law and International Relations, of empirical findings, conceptual redevelopment and
theoretical innovation. Importantly for my situation and situatedness as a scholar in the
global south Heritage is also a site that allows the clash between hegemonic/Eurocentric
positivist science and other ways of knowing to play out. In the literature I have reviewed
and cited in this study, I have not exclusively relied on the work of scholars from the

7

Unkule p 102
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global south or scholars pledging allegiance to non-western or post-colonial discourses.
As reflected in my previous work, my attempt is not to replace one hegemony with
another but to achieve harmony. The findings of this study are more relevant to tangible
cultural heritage. However, a promising area of further research would be applying the
analytical possibilities created by the study to investigate questions surrounding the
protection of intangible cultural heritage.
The next chapter deals with the research methodology of the study somewhat
unconventionally by thoroughly reviewing the epistemological traditions in International
Relations and International Law and outlining what scholars on both sides have so far
been able to achieve joining forces. Chapters three, four and five deal respectively with
the game theory, human security and constructivist frameworks from International
Relations, as applied to the case of heritage protection. The role that international law
has played in heritage protection is critically assessed within each theoretical edifice.
Chapter six turns to responses in international law and groups them as legalisation,
criminalisation and regulation, again concentrating on wartime destruction of and illegal
trade in cultural property. Together with the analysis presented in the foregoing
chapters, findings on responses from international law lead us to conclude that
approaches from International Relations and International Law working together
present international cooperation in a particular domain in different light, as a step
towards reconceptualising the role of law in international politics. Major conclusions of
the study are listed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 2
Seeking: Research Methodology
Chapter Highlights


The disciplines of International Law and International Relations differ greatly in
their methodological starting points



The adversarial nature of legal practice exerts a marked influence on the
traditions of legal research



Method in International Relations has been shaped by the discipline’s aspirations
to be at once policy relevant and taken seriously as a science; for its conceptual
building blocks, it has borrowed heavily from other social sciences; the discipline
continues to be western-centric



A common research agenda for both disciplines has been spoken of in recent
decades but never engaging with their methodological orientations as this
chapter attempts



Heritage as a case study has rich potential for interdisciplinary collaboration
between International Relations and International Law, especially if interpreted as
a “site” for meeting of various influences, understandings and approaches



Reflexivity and self-awareness need to be an explicit part of thinking about
method in International Relations and International Law

12

Method in Legal Research and International Law
In legal science, according to Jaap Hage, “The adoption of a method is a choice for what
counts as relevant ... (and) the kind of data that must be collected in order to argue for
or against a potential piece of knowledge”8. This adversarial and interpretive approach
marks off legal research from the understanding of method in the social sciences.
Mathias Siems is critical of this traditional approach finding that it makes much of legal
scholarship insular, self-referential and advocacy in disguise9.
Lee Epstein and Gary King concede that “perfectionism in methods at the expense of
other goals is both inappropriate and unnecessary”10. However, they do also lament the
absence in legal scholarship of “the methods of statistics, interviewing, ethnographies,
modelling, participant observation, experiments, network analysis, archival work,
historical studies, and many other diverse approaches”, as found in “political
methodology, econometrics, psychometrics, or sociological methodology”11. Richard
Revesz has argued, au contraire, that legal scholarship has become ever more
interdisciplinary over the years and “social scientists would benefit from paying close

8

Hage J. (2011), The Method of a truly normative legal science in Van Hoecke M. (ed.), Methodologies of Legal
Research: Which Kind of Method for what kind of discipline?, Hart Publishing, p 22
9
Siems, MM. (2011), A world without Law Professors in Van Hoecke M. (ed.), Methodologies of Legal
Research: Which Kind of Method for what kind of discipline?, Hart Publishing, p 81
10
In their reply to discussant submissions to their paper Epstein L and King G (2002), The Rules of Inference,
University of Chicago Law Review 69 (1), p 207
11
p 209
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attention to the methodological innovations performed by legal scholars”12. Paul Roberts
opts for a more pragmatic position in stating that “smart methodology means selecting
‘horses for courses’, the opposite of unthinking conformity to methodological dogma or
transient intellectual fashions”13.
According to Manderson and Mohr, “legal research means finding the law” and so far
what is conventionally understood as legal research has “little to do with how things get
to be called law, or how they are experienced as such, and with what effects”14.
Manderson and Mohr further attribute these shortcomings of legal research to “a
profoundly short-term and limited understanding of the actual nature and principles of
‘law’”15. This study is undertaken based on the observation that these pieces are even
more conspicuously missing in case of international law and adopts an interdisciplinary
approach to address the gaps.
Paul Roberts attempts to outline the crux of legal research in these words16:
Legal research ‘takes law seriously’ in terms of its methodological presuppositions and
engagement with primary institutional sources ... (which) include treaties, constitutions,
legislation and precedent cases, but also procedural codes, ‘hard-working soft law’ norms
and the informal operational routines that mediate between law in the books and law in
action.
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Revesz RL. (2002), A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, University of Chicago Law Review 69 (1), p 169
Roberts P., Interdisciplinarity in Legal research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017), Research
Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press, p 100
14
Manderson D and Mohr R. (2002), From Oxymoron to intersection: an epidemiology of legal research, Law
Text Culture Vol 6, p160
15
P 161
16
Roberts P., Interdisciplinarity in Legal research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017), Research
Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press, p 95
13
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Below, I have reviewed some of the nudges towards interdisciplinary research that have
emerged from within the discipline of law.
Geoffrey Samuel attributes instances of isolation of law from social reality to the
overwhelming emphasis on structure and coherence within the discipline and its
aspiration to be regarded as a science. As a way out of this self-referential cycle, he
reminds us that legal rules and institutions are meant to express a vision of justice,
adding17:
...if justice is a phenomenon that exists independently of law one will need to turn to other
social science disciplines...in order to give substance and definition to the phenomenon.
Manderson and Mohr similarly derive the possibility of scholarship in law with reference
to considerations exogenous to law itself, stating that “law as a process of debating
between outcomes offers thereby a language for articulating issues of morality and
justice”18. More generally, they argue for the need to account for multiple reference
groups as unifying law as technique, law as scholarship and legal ethics.
Ultimately, in answer to the question as to whether law is a social science, Samuel
concludes that it has the ability to be so when it steps outside of the authority paradigm.
The authority paradigm in law stems from the theological origins of law. Later in this
chapter, I discuss how a conversation between positivist science on the one hand and
theology and other ways of knowing on the other, opens the door for closer
collaboration between international relations and international law.

17

Samuel G. (2008), Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law, Cambridge Law Journal
67(2),p 295
18 18
Manderson D and Mohr R. (2002), From Oxymoron to intersection: an epidemiology of legal research, Law
Text Culture Vol 6, p160
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Commenting on the preponderance of doctrinal research in the discipline of law, Ian
Dobinson and Francis Johns summarise the prevailing view as follows19:
The main arguments are that law is an authoritative, rules-based discipline where doctrinal
observations are merely self-referential and do not reveal anything about the outside world.
However such arguments also acknowledge that where law engages with society in a way
revealed by legal realists or where a researcher reaches beyond jurisdictional authority to
consider comparative law issues, then that doctrinal research may take on some of the
elements of social science research.
Manderson and Mohr contend that it is due to the tradition of doctrinal scholarship
compared to social sciences, law has more in common with theology “in terms of its
exegetical cast, its faith in authority and its devotion to untangling the intricacies of
canonical texts”20. The question of interest to them is not the intersection of law with
other disciplines but the intersection of law with the idea of research itself.
Dobinson and Johns further document how the internal professional pull of legal reform
and the external academic push of needing to align research methods with other
disciplines, has brought research in law ever closer to social science research21. However,
these authors do also add the caveat that “the social science model cannot be wholly
applied to legal research because the source documents are derived in a different way”,
i.e. a more inductive and hierarchical approach than is practicable in the social sciences.
Instead, they emphasize that what legal research can truly hope to gain from the social

19

Dobinson I and Johns F, Legal Research as Qualitative Research, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017),
Research Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press, p 21
20
p 163
21
Dobinson and Johns’ main contention is that “law is not simply self referential but can teach us about the
world”. (p 35)
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scientific approach is “the discipline of a thorough, unbiased and reproducible
methodology”22.
Paul Roberts alerts us to the inevitable friction that can result from the conjoint
operation of two or more disciplines in a research study adding that “incompatible
standpoints and perspectives can sometimes be more productive, energising or revealing
that seamless coherence, harmony and integration”23. Indeed, such has been the case
with the interactions between International Relations and International Law as we will
see below.
The growing importance of socio-legal research has been proposed in the context of
possibilities for interdisciplinary research in law. A growing body of scholars today accord
great significance to context in legal research pointing out that “A precondition for legal
research in any form has become that the researcher should not only have knowledge
about the traditional elements of the law, but also about the quickly changing societal,
political, economic and technological contexts and, possibly, other aspects of
relevance”24.
This study falls at the intersection of international relations theory and international law.
Although influenced by exploratory, explanatory, historical and comparative studies, it
primarily engages in critical, analytical research. For instance, in forthcoming chapters,
the comparative merits and limitations of the rational choice, human security and
constructivist frameworks are discussed in relation to protection of cultural heritage but

22

p 35
P 92
24
Philip Langbroek, Kees van den Bos, Marc Simon Thomas, Michael Milo, Wibo van Rossum (2017),
Methodology of Legal Research: Challenges and Opportunities, Utrecht Law Review, Vol 13 (3), p1
23
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going further, in each case, an analytical takeaway is arrived at which extends our
conceptual understanding of the frameworks themselves. From a quality control
standpoint, this study has found the following advice particularly instructive25:
The quality of legal research is gauged by the quality of the conceptual analysis, the quality
of the reasoning and the rhetoric, and last, but not least, the quality of the references in the
text.
Method in International Relations
Stanley Hoffman distils the philosophical preoccupations of the international relations
scholar in these words26:
... they wrote about the difference between a domestic order stable enough to afford a
search for the ideal state, and an international contest in which order has to be established
first, and which often clashes with any aspiration to justice.
The first noteworthy point in these lines is that in International Relations analysis,
international politics is not a mere extension of domestic politics just as the international
system is not simply, a domestic polity writ large. Yet, certain assumptions about human
behaviour, social control and the nature of power have been adopted from domestic
politics. The second noteworthy point is that for generations of International Relations
scholars the conception of order in the international system has not always been
underpinned by an insistence on prioritising justice. Does this latter observation mean
that International Relations has nothing to offer International Law in terms of

25

Supra note 16, p 2
Hoffman S. (1977), An American Social Science: International Relations, Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3,
Discoveries and Interpretations: Studies in Contemporary Scholarship, Volume I (Summer), pp. 41-60
26
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articulating a conception of justice, as many believe to be the promise of interdisciplinary
engagement? It has been established in existing literature that theoretical perspectives
developed by International Relations Scholars provide a variety of frameworks to
articulate our vision of international society. Based on each vision, a different and wellspecified approach to the relevance and form of international law emerges. In
forthcoming chapters, conceptual lenses from International Relations – rational choice,
human security and constructivism – are evaluated in relation to the concern of
protecting cultural heritage. We find that:
1. Normative positions are written into the theoretical perspectives themselves
2. International Relations draws significantly from conceptual building blocks
developed in other social sciences which originated from the quest for a just
social order
3. When the operation in the real world of policies based on these paradigms is
observed, it becomes evident who gains and does not from them
4. The role of epistemic and linguistic dominance in obstructing a genuine debate on
“justice” is uncovered
Therefore, concludes the study, that although in their purest form International Relations
theories may not serve as useful guides to outline a vision of international justice, their
application in real world scenarios is highly instructive.
Drawing attention to the emphasis on empiricism in international relations, Hoffman
further asks27: Without a study of political relations, how could one understand the

27

p 42

19

fumblings and failures of international law, or the tormented debates on the foundation of
obligation among sovereigns unconstrained by common values or superior power? It is
interesting that Hoffman, among others in the discipline of International Relations,
consider Hans Morgenthau, a teacher of international law, to be one of the founders of
International Relations as a discipline. Morgenthau’s approach of blending empiricism
with normativism appears to have left a lasting legacy for International Relations. The
wide scope and sweep of his work also laid the foundations for an analytical orientation
focused on the system. Through an examination of the evolution of the realist school in
international relations, Hoffman relates how the link which exists between scientific
disciplines and State institutions and interests, usually uncomfortably, happens to be
more robust in the case of International Relations. He lists an articulation of the concept
of “system” as a web of interaction between states, the “rules of the game” that
emerge from deterrence literature, and a specification of the role played by economic
interdependence in interstate relations, as the three major contributions of disciplinary
International Relations. Since the Cold War context in which the first two of these
contributions were made no longer applies and the assumptions of a thriving liberal
economic order on which the third contribution rests have been seriously undercut in the
twenty first century, the continuing relevance of the discipline, lacking further innovation
and advances, may be called into question. This study therefore advocates a two-way
interdisciplinary dialogue in which the work of international legal scholars provides
inspiration and impetus to the evolution of International Relations.
Reviewing the contribution of structural realist Kenneth Waltz to International Relations,
Charlotte Epstein identifies two key dimensions: firstly, a move away from empiricism
and an inductive approach to analysis and second, “the establishment of the
20

international as a discrete, constitutive, space; not simply as that indeterminate space
beyond, in between or ‘among nations’’28. From the perspective of international legal
scholars, however, Waltz’s strong emphasis on theorising underestimates how much
international agreements factor into the decision-making calculus of policy-makers. The
Liberal School of International Relations, by contrast, renders the international system as
a reflection of the relationships that exist between state and civil society (strictly
speaking interest groups) at the domestic level. They view foreign policy in the same way
as they do the domestic variant – interests organising to achieve their goals through the
system of governance. It is thus that they derive the Democratic Peace Thesis whereby
liberal democracies shun war for being antithetical to the interests of the governed. With
respect to international law, proponents of the liberal view would therefore contend
“that liberal democracies are more likely than are other regime types to revere law,
promote compromise, and respect processes of adjudication”29. Another hypothesis
derived from the liberal view of the international system is that economic
interdependence drives up the cost of conflict by linking the interests of domestic
constituencies in various states, and is therefore desirable for systemic stability. While
studying regime characteristics as a determinant of external policy, including compliance
with international law, scholars have also investigated differences between federal and
unitary states, parliamentary and presidential systems and common and civil law
systems. Broadly speaking, while the realists are preoccupied with the system as a unit of

28

Epstein C. (2013), Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International Relations. Why returning
to language is vital to prolonging the owl’s flight, European Journal of International Relations, Vol 19, p 503
29
Simmons BA (1998), Compliance with International Agreements, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 1998. 1:75–93
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analysis, the liberal international relations scholar’s gaze is focused on the regime
characteristics of the state.
Describing International Relations as a “not so international discipline”, Ole Waever
points out its major characteristics as follows30:


The discipline’s evolution has closely modelled the existence of American
hegemony in the real world



The discipline has borrowed heavily from other social sciences but simultaneously
asserted its separate identity, in particular by embracing rational choice as the
predominant analytical framework



International Relations scholarship in the United States is oriented towards
rational choice as the metatheoretical framework whereas European scholarship
demonstrates a greater influence of constructivism and postmodernism

Even as International Relations has developed largely in the US and is heavily influenced
by historical and institutional variables obtaining there, the contributions of scholars in
other regions do help address important questions of our time31. Christer Jonsson
describes International Relations scholarship emerging from Scandinavia as “prone to
focus on subnational actors, ... more embedded in political science, ... generalist rather
than specialist... (and) in a better position to escape from the entrapment of an
ahistorical current-events approach”32. Jonsson points out that unlike their American

30

Waever O. (2005), The Sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European Developments
in International Relations, International Organisation Vol 52(4), pp 687-727
31
In a footnote of a work cited in this chapter, Onuma Yasuyaki has linked a decline in academic interest in
International law in Japan with progressive Americanisation of international studies since the 1970s
32
Jonsson C. (1993), International Politics: Scandinavian Identity amidst American Hegemony?, Scandinavian
Political Studies Vol 16(2), pp 149-165
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counterparts, Scandinavian specialists of International Relations have maintained the
research stance of an observer and not an advisor and as a result have had much success
in explaining the nature of international cooperation. Jonsson concurs with the
assessment above that the emphasis on grand theorising in International Relations,
which has been a byproduct of the Cold War context, weakens its claims to continued
relevance. Instead he argues33:
...the periphery – including Scandinavia – has been more involved in testing and refining
middle-range theories [...] such as decision-making, conflict management, bargaining, and
integration (which) have not been called into question by recent world events.
Jonsson further notes that while in the United States, International Relations has staked
its claims as an independent discipline, in Scandinavia it has, au contraire, developed as a
subfield of political science and in close connection with comparative politics. This has
enabled Scandinavian International Relations scholarship to pay more attention to those
questions which “involve a complex of domestic and international political processes”34.
Asking whether “realism and liberalism (are) genuinely universal”35, Amitav Acharya
surveys the proposed influences that might shape a non-Western theory of International
Relations. Some of the attempts that have so far been made in this direction take the
approach of studying emerging powers or countries from the global south as outliers.
However, it is increasingly clear that the assumptions undergirding realist stability or the

33

p 152
p 155
35
Acharya A. (2011), Dialogue and Discovery: In search of International Relations Theories beyond the West,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39(3) 619–637
34
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ethos of linear progression central to liberalism are today seriously challenged in the
western world too.
Looking back on their approach to theory, International Relations scholars have found
their historical aspiration to be policy relevant36 to have had decisive implications for the
evolution of the discipline in two ways: 1. The resemblance of theoretical frameworks to
ground reality during important periods in history 2. The emphasis on producing middlerange theories which seek to establish the relationship between input and output
variables in law-like fashion. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon help us uncover
the ideational assumptions underlying this general disciplinary approach as making “a
number of commitments concerning the law-like character of good knowledge, the
representational nature of empirical claims, and the ‘Humean’ account of causality. In
other words, such middle-range theorizing generally depends on a neopositivist
worldview, and on a wager that neopositivism — as distinct from other, equally
‘scientific’ methodological perspectives — provides a definitively superior grasp of the
world”37.
Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wright present a more comprehensive account of the
various theoretical denominations in the discipline38: 1. Explanatory theory which
prioritises utility and predictive capacity; 2. Critical theory which aims to bring about
normative change; 3. Constitutive theory which investigates the influence of ideas on
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observable facts. As a result, argues Arlene Tickner, this places International Relations in
the same category of the rest of Western science which erects synthetic walls between
modern/premodern, human/non-human, fact/value, nature/culture, and on which its
hegemonic standing is premised. The core-periphery dynamic which characterises real
world relations under pyramid globalisation, has very much been the operative scheme
of the global spread of the International Relations discipline. Thus, the obsession with
policy-relevance of metropolitan International Relations is mirrored in peripheral regions.
Tickner observes, “research agendas in IR throughout the global South seem to parallel
those of the foreign policy agendas of states, reinforcing the idea that theory should
operate as a toolbox that derives from the realities that states must address in their
international dealings”39, making International Relations an extreme case of
asymmetrical knowledge. Worse, since the of philosophical and ideational lineage of
western theories is alien to other parts of the world, use of theory there is not
methodologically rigorous, further hurting the prospects of localised development of
theory.
Dovetails and Departures: the conversation between International Law and International
Relations so far
In the mind of the International Relations scholar, the malleability of diplomacy lends
itself much better to international life than the straitjacket of law. The conception of
international law in the mind of the international legal scholar closely approximates an
ingrained understanding of domestic law. As noted earlier, theorising in International
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Relations is concerned primarily with order and justice has been a secondary concern if at
all. Due to the influence of the parent discipline of Law, International Legal scholarship is
much more interested in contending with the question of a just order. Expressing this
dilemma, Onuma Yasuaki writes40:
If we understand the ‘essence’ of law as the realisation of justice, we may think that a major
function of international law is to provide a tool for achieving international justice. If, on the
other hand, we see the role of law as that of camouflaging the dominance and exploitation
by the establishment of a society, then a major function of international law can be seen as
that of justifying global dominance and exploitation by the powerful developed countries.
Yasuaki considers distinguishing law from the politics and ethics of international society
as key to specifying its nature and promise. His analysis uncovers an important impetus
for interdisciplinary work in International Law. He contends that the discipline has
neglected investigating the drivers of status quo in the international system. In a similar
vein, the common understanding of positive law has not been critically examined and
further extended beyond “the category of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute41, especially
explicit provisions in existing treaties and norms of customary international law as
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exemplified by leading Western international lawyers”42. For scholarship in International
Relations, the status quo or “systemic stability” has indeed been a key concern. Realists
have elevated it as a prime variable for disciplinary investigation, liberals have closely
observed interactions with and among its moving parts and constructivists have sought
to discover its relationship with an extrinsic realm of ideas. Although positivist
international lawyers do not consciously engage with these theoretical foundations, they
nevertheless “invite international politics into their home through the back door”, argues
Yasuaki. This opens up the possibilities for scholarship in international law which
knowingly engages with conceptions of international society reciprocally has the
potential to influence disciplinary International Relations. Another noteworthy feature of
International Legal analysis is that although exponents differ on whether international
law is best viewed as an authoritative decision-making process or a framework
facilitating cooperation, there is across the board a tendency to view soft law as
“something minus legal commitment”43. This study highlights the rich spectrum of forms
of international cooperation and their drivers that the discipline of International
Relations has been able to observe and articulate. In the process, it should provide
International Lawyers with a stronger case for seeing soft law in more promising light.
Exemplifying a common tendency among international lawyers, Philip Allott ascribes a
social function to international law, claiming that all law “1. […] carries the structure and
systems of society through time. 2. […] inserts the common interests of society into the
behaviour of society-members. 3. […] establishes possible futures for society, in
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accordance with society’s theories, values and purposes”44. International Relations
scholars, operating differently, are careful in distinguishing between a domestic polity
and an international system. The centralising and unifying authority of law is not
recognised in the International Relations scholar’s imagination of the anarchic
international system. The argument between the two disciplines comes down to
specifying how law and power interact with each other. In this thesis I attempt to expand
this understanding of law by teasing out the non-judicial functions of international law
and exploring ways in which a dialogue between International Law and International
Relations enables us to envision different possibilities for international law.
Elaborating further on the concept of International Law, Allott offers the following
description that is amenable to the International Relations scholar’s more expansive view
of what makes international politicking45:
The legal self-constituting of society (the legal constitution) co-exists with other means of
social self-constituting: self-constituting in the form of ideas (the ideal constitution) and
self-constituting through the everyday willing and acting of society-members (the real
constitution).
This description also corresponds to a broader understanding of sources of international
law which includes customary law in addition to treaty law. When Allott further portrays
law as conditioned by the ideal and real self-constituting, yet possessing its own
distinctive social form, we see a striking parallel with the key theme in constructivist
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International Relations that actors, rules and institutions are conditioned by socially
constituted meanings.
To Manderson and Mohr46:
The socio-legal scholar operates in a distinct genre, committed to the sphere of human
goods and contingent particulars, not eternal verities and universals.
International Legal scholars also suggest that the nature of research in international law
is different from that in domestic law. Stephen Hall writes that the “decentralised,
consensual and relatively primitive character47” of international law challenges us to seek
new approaches to research rather than relying on off-the-shelf tools from largely
domestically oriented legal research.
Describing the conception of the actorhood of states in International Law, Hall explains
that “States are simultaneously the main subjects of international law and the entities
whose choices and conduct generate positive international law”48. He adds that where
the State is legal person, governing institutions which exercise power on behalf of the
State are akin to the corresponding natural persons.
Anne Marie Slaughter advocates cross fertilisation between insights from International
Relations and International Law through the cultivation of a “dual agenda”49. She
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surveys the responses which International Relations scholars have offered to the realist
contention that international law is at best an instrument of dominant states and finds:


McDougal and Lasswell’s formulation of law as derived from competitive political
interaction and therefore a subset of the decision-making process in the
international system



Falk’s vision of law as derived from a systemic logic that transcends national
interest narrowly defined in pursuit of systemic stability



Chayes, Henkin and others’ concern with showing in what ways (rather than to
what extent), international law proves to be a constraint on state behaviour and
influences the course of international affairs



Hoffman and Kaplan’s understanding of “international law of a particular era as
both a reflection of the reining political system and a repository of normative
efforts to regulate and shape it”50.

A wider menu of formats for inter-state cooperation is acknowledged within
International Relations. Other than treaty law, this list includes unilateral/bilateral
cooperation, formation of multilateral fora and soft law. Broadly speaking, the view in
the International Relations community is that States align their behavior with
international laws when they reflect the interests and values of states and when they are
formulated through processes or by organisations that are perceived as legitimate.
However, it is only through a conversation with International legal scholars that
International Relations theorists have had to rigorously examine regimes of interaction
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and cooperation. In “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations”,
Abbott and Snidal argue51:
Possible types of arrangement for inter-state cooperation are –


Decentralized cooperation



Informal consultation



Treaty Rules

Despite the existence of such alternatives, states frequently resort to creation of
International organizations to institutionalize cooperation. The two markers of IOs
which, according to Snidal and Abbott, explain this preference of states are:



Centralization



Independence

Centralization refers to “a concrete and stable organizational structure and an
administrative apparatus managing collective activities52”. When the costs of
decentralized action or unilateral intervention outweigh the costs of centralized
organization, the creation of an IO becomes attractive to states.
IOs contribute the following through centralization:
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Neutral, depoliticized and specialized fora for dialogue



Balance between states with different levels of power and varying interests
through representation and voting rules



Expertise in the form of background research and structured agendas



Flows of information, institutional memory and documentation of state of play on
a certain issue area

Thus pooling of resources, competencies and risks is what centralization is all about and
wherefrom IOs have an edge over decentralized or bilateral cooperation or unilateral
action.
Independence refers to “the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with
neutrality, in defined spheres”. An independent International Organization has the
potential to:


Influence the terms of state interaction



Elaborate norms



Mediate or resolve member states’ disputes



Affect legitimacy of member states’ actions

To sum up, actions taken on a state-to-state level, appear more legitimate when routed
through an IO instead – a process that Snidal and Abbott term “laundering”. Another
advantage of IO independence lies in the fact that leaders are able to shield themselves
from often overbearing assertion of interests from domestic constituencies. Lastly, even
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if “IO autonomy remains bounded by state interests and power”, strong states do also
have a stake in not allowing their actions to completely undermine IO independence.
Snidal and Abbott also conceptualize IOs as Community Representatives. Here, the
characterization of IOs departs from the rationalist discourse and crosses over into
constructivist terrain. In particular, IOs perform two important functions:


Creating a language based on norms and ensuring adherence to norms through
“mobilization of shame” or reputational concerns among states



Enforcement of commitments by making the threat of retaliation meaningful in
cases of non-compliance

For the research agenda at the intersection of international relations and international
law, Snidal and Abbott prescribe the study of International Organizations as a bridge
between rationalism and constructivism.
By discussing compliance behavior in broader terms, international relations scholars have
maintained its distinction from a strict technical understanding such as treaty
implementation. A useful approach to unpacking the reasons behind States’ compliance
of international law is the one proposed by Robert Keohane. Keohane distinguishes
between the instrumentalist optic where rules matter only if they affect calculations of
interest and the normative optic where compliance is driven by reputational concerns53.
Beth Simmons argues that real world compliance defies simplistic explanations since
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“agreements among asymmetrically endowed actors are rarely perfectly voluntary, and
the decision to “conform to prescribed behavior” might rest on an amalgam of
obligation and felt coercion”54.
Cali refers to the instrumental view on international law as the “cynic’s view”, describing
it thus:
For the cynic, all international law does, is offer some intricate language which politicians
use to get their own way55.
She counters this cynicism by suggesting that “the survival of the idea and practice of
international law after hundreds of years of manipulation shows us that there is
something more to it than mere rhetoric”.
In establishing the divergences and overlaps between the disciplines of International
Relations and International Law, Cali holds:
There are two central independent variables that determine the nature of the
relationship between International Relations and International Law.
1. Reasons motivating the asking of a question.
2. Reasons motivating the selection of procedures in order to answer a question.
The former indicates differences in terms of approaches. The latter indicates differences
in methodology56.
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She goes on to explain that “the legal element has a more significant weight in
International Law, while in International Relations it is the political element that takes
center stage. International lawyers ask when we have international law. International
relations scholars ask how international actors behave”57.
“What are the rules and principles that govern international relations and how do we
identify such rules?” and “what makes states support a particular norm in international
relations and how do we know when support for that norm erodes or increases?58” are
identified by Cali as key questions at the heart of International Law and International
Relations respectively.
In Cooperation under Anarchy, Axelrod and Keohane state, “not only can actors in world
politics pursue different strategies within an established context of interaction, they may
also seek to alter that context through building institutions embodying particular
principles, norms, rules, or procedures for the conduct of international relations”59.
Applying the prisoner’s dilemma game to interstate cooperation, these authors focus on
three dimensions in particular:


Mutuality of interest



The shadow of the future



The number of players
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An attempt is made in a forthcoming chapter to apply principles of game theory to the
cause of heritage protection.
Philip Allott discusses the social function of the law as signaling “presence of the social
past, the organizing of the social present, and the conditioning of the social future”60.
Allott likens an international public realm devoid of International Law with the Hobbesian
state of nature, with “urbane diplomacy and mass murder” as the bases for survival. He
characterizes the minimization of the role of law in mainstream International Relations
Scholarship thus:
So-called international relations seemed to be the more or less random aggregating of the
aggregate output of the systems of those societies, so that the absence of potential moral
responsibility was even more evidently the case between the States than within those
States. It seemed also to follow that international law, even more than national law, was
morally immune, since it was itself seen as a secondary surplus social effect of the morally
immune relations between States, the content of those relations—so-called foreign
policy—being itself the morally immune systematic product of the internal national
systems61.
He explains this by problematizing morality at any aggregate social level. Since the
outcome at any aggregate social level, or as Allott describes it, “the surplus social
effect”, is always greater than the sum of its parts, no single individual may be held
accountable for it. This results in a situation where, since no human individual is
responsible for the macro-product of social systems, there can be no moral responsibility
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for that product, including the macro-product known as law. Apparently, the social
actual, and hence the legal actual, is necessarily right”. Thus, to Allott, the problem of
specifying the role of international law in international society is a more generic
conundrum of attribution of moral responsibility at all macro levels.
In an attempt to theorize non-instrumental law in general and international law in
particular, Terry Nardin writes62:
General international law is largely customary law, which obligates states as members of
international society without their explicit consent. States can terminate their agreements
but they cannot escape the jurisdiction of general international law, which, because it both
constitutes and regulates the relationship of states as legal subjects, is the ultimate basis of
their association. The rule of law demands that international law must not contravene
certain basic rules of general international law. Agreement cannot legalise actions, like
waging aggressive war, that are contrary to the non-instrumental rules of general
international law. That law limits the policies that states can pursue collectively as well as
unilaterally. The instrumental rules they adopt must conform to the non-instrumental rules
of general international law and, at a deeper level, the principles of legality underlying those
rules. The international rule of law exists to the extent that states conduct their relations on
the basis of laws that limit and not simply enable policy.
This passage illustrates the contribution that international legal scholarship has made
towards explaining the determinants of state behaviour in the international realm.
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As discussed above, there are two distinct conceptions of the payoff of interdisciplinary
exposure for legal research. Dobinson and Johns anticipate gains in the form of a
reproducible methodology. Roberts, on the other hand, emphasises greater analytical
complexity and nuance as the main advantage. How do the conversations between
International Law and International Relations fare in terms of meeting these
expectations?
In this study I apply lenses from International Relations and International Law to
demonstrate their contributions on such questions as:
What is heritage?
What contextual factors influence the definition of heritage?
Who owns it?
What is the proper way of protecting it and can it be applied universally?
What does studying transnational efforts to protect heritage tell us about the nature of
international cooperation?
How does studying the case of heritage protection, in depth, contribute to our
understanding of the potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between the fields of
International Relations and International Law?
How might such an interdisciplinary dialogue transform our understanding of the nature,
role and potential of international law?
It is relevant to clarify the way in which heritage is meant as a case study here. In general,
a case study represents intensive analysis in contrast with a survey which represents
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extensive analysis of a phenomenon. Thus, the approaches selected for critical analysis,
both from International Relations and International Law, are not exhaustive. Instead,
their choice is informed by the possibilities they afford to illuminate various facets of the
case study. An attempt has been made to draw in some of the marginal and underemphasized approaches in order to truly test and challenge the current state of the
debate on the interplay between international relations and international law. The
following lines of Peter Swanborn are resonant in this respect63:
As in all research, in doing a case study we focus on the problem we want to solve.
Whatever research project one has in mind, the research question is the point of departure.

Heritage as site
With reference to themes such as “cities” or “drugs”, Manderson and Mohr propose the
following approach that may assist us in evading the downsides of disciplinary silos and
over-specialisation64:
One approach might be to examine a particular site or sites of interest without a particular
disciplinary strategy in mind. It is the site as observed and not the intellectual tradition of
the observer which determines the approach.
Mandersohn and Mohr add that this framework taps into the relevant aspects of
disciplines without allowing their role in research to become overbearing and
hegemonic, thus making legal research “disciplinary-critical, site-specific, engaged and
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constitutive”65. The concept of heritage richly lends itself to such an understanding of
site.
Heritage as a site for meeting of past, present and future
Discovering heritage as the space where the past, present and future converge is
presenting it in dynamic light, rather than as a culturally-specific relic stuck in time. It is
also to acknowledge, that the past matters because it tangibly impinges on
circumstances in the present and prospects for the future. Based on her study of the
evolving meanings of Heritage in eastern Europe, Laura Demeter posits that “the use and
abuse of heritage has reached a level of impact, intensity and differing complexities that
has little in common with the realities of heritage in the Anglo-Saxon context”66.
Heritage is subject to interpretive evolution. Illustrating this point with the example of
the Palace of Versailles, Denise Maior-Barron writes that “the postmodern era witnesses
a gradual transition in the interpretation of heritage from Tradition to Translation”67.
Thus the same sites and objects contain different mnemonic associations for different
groups and across time periods. Maior-Baron goes on to explain that political elite
reinterpret history through heritage in service of their own legitimation and therefore
often, the “version of history labelled ‘inevitable progress’ is preferred by victors rather
than victims”68. In the age of nationalism, such reinterpretation to suit political interests
has contributed to problematizing heritage conservation in source countries and
complicated the debate over ownership and optimum methods of conservation in the

65

p 174
Demeter L. (2014), Value Creation Mechanisms and the Heritisation of the Communist Legacy in Romania in
Viliekis O. (ed) The Right to [World] Heritage: Conference Proceedings, BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg
67
Maior-Barron D. (2014), Palace of Versailles UNESCO Heritage Site: Survivor of the French Revolution, in
Viliekis O. (ed) The Right to [World] Heritage: Conference Proceedings, BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg
68
Ibid p 98
66

40

international realm. Maior-Baron further notes that the rise in commemorative politics
around the world in the recent past aims to “ritualise a society without rituals and to
introduce fleeting moments of sacredness into a world otherwise bereft of a sacred
dimension”69. Thus, as a by-product of fulfilling a psycho-social need for familiarity,
distinctiveness and continuity, heritage contributes as a “freezing factor of the natural
course of historical evolution”70, in her estimate. This is an on-going process as seen
through the instant memorialisation of sites of tragedy such as bombings in a bid to link
present grief with future sanctity.
Having established the role of heritage in reinterpreting history and legitimising power
rooted in construction of hegemonic identity, one must also give due regard to the
positive implications of such potential. In her report to the UN Human Rights Council, the
Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights observes71:
By engaging people and encouraging their interaction through artistic and cultural
expression, actions in the field of culture can open a space in which individuals and groups
can reflect upon their society, confront and modify their perception of one another, express
their fears and grievances in a non-violent manner, develop resilience after violent or
traumatic experiences, including human rights violations, and imagine the future they want
for themselves and how to better realize human rights in the society they live in.
Thus, the shape-shifting associations with heritage should be viewed against the ever
evolving backdrop of a broader cultural landscape. In case of conflicts which coalesce
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around faultlines of identity, in particular, this potential for creative reconstitution could
well translate into the power to assist social reconstruction. As the Special Rapporteur
on Cultural Rights reminds us: “Humanity dignifies, restores and reimagines itself
through creating, performing, preserving and revising its cultural and artistic life”. In
settings of violent ethnic conflict cultural activities involving celebration of common
heritage have been vital for expressing common humanity or rehumanising the other,
thereby contributing to trust building and reconstruction.
Heritage as a site for meeting of identities and interests
Interest and identity have both been polemical and polarising terms in discussions about
international society, particularly under the influence of globalisation. Studying heritage
protection in the context of both terms demonstrates what we lose when we attempt to
parse phenomena in light of one, at the exclusion of the other. Heritage, as a site,
enables us to liberate the two terms from narrow definitional strictures and create new
possibilities for the study of International Relations and International Law at large.
Tracing back the ancient nexus between art, identity and heritage, Margaret Miles recalls
that “much, if not all of what was highly valued in antiquity, and typically looted in wars,
was originally created, dedicated or used within a religious context […] although art
even in a religious context could also convey political values, including symbolic value as
a trophy”72. Sara McDowell conceived the very essence of heritage in terms of its
malleability and instrumental value defining it as “as an aggregation of myths, values and
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inheritances determined and defined by the needs of societies in the present.73” Denise
Maior-Baron posits a symbiotic relationship between heritage and power and illustrates
it through the associations of successive rulers and governments in France with the
Palais de Versailles despite its complicated past. Delving into this history she finds that
heritage can be evocative of legitimate power and authority “within either the artificial
remembering and commemorative process of nations, or the educational purposes of
contemporary, globalised tourism”74. The fact that heritage can serve both purposes as
outlined here by Maior-Baron contributes to the contested terrain that is the idea of
“universal heritage”. On the one hand, the nationalist view demands a set of contextdependent practices that tie heritage to origin stories and national identity while on the
other, the cosmopolitan view is centred on logics of tourism, cultural consumption of
market countries and the considerable commercial interest at stake. It is in the premeditated destruction of heritage during the course of war that we see its relationship
with identity thrown in sharp relief, especially as the emerging complexities of warfare
blur the battle lines between identities and interests. In recent memory we see such
convergence of destructive factors of wartime collateral damage through shelling and
occupation, deliberate erasure as a language of terrorism, genocide and civil war and
varying scales of looting for financial gain in the damage that has been sustained to
heritage in Syria.
Heritage as a site for meeting of International Relations and International Law
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The study of cultural heritage has thus far been undertaken within disciplinary silos as is
the case with many multi-faceted concepts and phenomena. A consequent limitation at
the epistemic level resulting from this is that “these disciplines bound conversations may
talk about very similar issues in completely diﬀerent languages, diminishing the
opportunity to learn from, and communicate with, one another”75.
Watfa Shadi and Mustafa Bashar poignantly capture the impact of heritage destruction
and the illegal trade in cultural objects on the countries of origin and the world at large76:
We feel a tragic loss when our valuable cultural artifacts disappear. They become fuel for
the black market, perpetuating the economic foundation of the plunder. Then they are lost
to all, having value neither for their beauty nor for scientific research where much could be
learned from them. Instead, they become hidden away in a collector’s vault, reduced to a
state of having no value for anyone, save for their illicit procurer.
The above articulation of the state of world heritage captures the possibility of
convergence of the Game Theory, Human Security and Constructivist approaches to
exploring possibilities of international cooperation, developed in forthcoming chapters.
It opens the way for unapologetically recognising the dysfunctions and asymmetries of
power in the international system which International Law either glosses over of helps
sustain and strengthen.
Heritage as a site for meeting of empirical findings and conceptual re-development and
theoretical innovation
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The field of heritage studies has been characterised by a practice-driven orientation.
Much of the existing literature is in the form of advocacy for competing approaches to
conservation. An extremely promising ramification of such an emphasis has been the
vast information base mapping where tangible and intangible heritage exists, detailing
the causes of destruction or illicit transfer in the form of case studies and specifying the
positions of relevant stakeholders. As noted above, the evidence of interdisciplinary
dialogue in heritage literature is limited. Where the applicable body of international law is
studied, the discussion focuses more on textual application of conventions and does not
properly contextualise the emergence and operation of legal instruments in broader
insights about operation of the international system.
However, according to Paul Roberts “simply highlighting significant gaps in the existing
knowledge base might be sufficient to puncture the complacency of prevailing
assumptions...”77.
In the case of destruction and illegal trade of cultural heritage, much work of great value
has documented the channels, operative methods, role of actors and extent of the
phenomenon. It appears however, that this body of work does not point to a clear
direction for legal reform and instead becomes clearly polarised along the lines of
opposing causes or interested parties. It is thus, for instance, that the binaries of the
nationalist and internationalist view or the source countries and market countries, have
dominated much of the discourse directly influencing legal imagination on the question.
According to Denis Byrne, the sub-discipline of heritage management within archaeology
has evolved based on Western experience and has since attempted to transplant its
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approaches to diverse contexts. Byrne also suggests that “imbued with the ideological
colour of their own societies”, archaeologists have reordered history to situate Europe at
the pinnacle of the “hierarchy of progress” by ascribing to it such attributes as
“technological pre-eminence” and “uni-linear cultural evolution”78. The fact that
“heritage management seems simply to appear with the passing of the first protective
legislation which itself occurs because an obvious ‘need’ is recognised”, strikes Byrne as
symptomatic of this one-size-fits-all approach. Further, he also recognises the continued
imprint left by imperial legislation on the imagination of heritage management in the
post-colonial world. “The legacy was not rejected; in fact there has been a widespread
tendency for the new states to use and conserve precolonial and even colonial
archaeological heritage in the name of national identity”, writes Byrne. As we have
established with the evolution of the discipline of International Relations, in the lines that
follow, Byrne relates the influential position of western archaeology with strategies of
dominance of powerful states79:
Their influence stemmed from the opportunities they had to work in other countries –
archaeology following the flag either directly or through the favourable climate created by
economic aid and military alliance – and from sponsoring the education of archaeologists
from non-Western countries at ‘home’ universities, their ability to publish and disseminate
research over large areas and from the intellectual thrall with which leading exponents at
great universities could hold their less advantaged colleagues over large parts of the world.
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Byrne’s analysis also shows us that lacking the social consensus or indeed the material
resources to implement a western model of conservation, third world countries are often
portrayed as uncaring of their heritage and their cultures as missing a sense of history.
Sandra Bowdler has explained the same phenomenon in terms of an almost Pavlovian
response of the “heritocracy” to any deviation from the hegemonic western discourse of
archaeological research and heritage management80.
Heritage as the site for clash of hegemonic/west-centric science and other ways of
knowing
Supriya Chaudhuri recalls81:
The World Fairs and exhibitions of the nineteenth century were sites of display where
colonial power oﬀered itself for public admiration, and objects of material culture, denuded
of social context and use-value, were accessible for consumption as spectacles.
Chaudhri paints a vivid picture of the growing fascination with displays of traditional
Indian crafts (such crafts not to be confused with the more evolved European fine arts)
in Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries even as the policies of
the imperial government82 impoverished the artisan community in India and slowly
eradicated this form of “industry”. The fate of indigenous crafts was not simply linked to
the economic processes unfolding in the hegemonic core but also to the apparatus of
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knowledge creation which supported these developments. Capturing the epistemic
dynamics, Chaudhuri writes83:
In important respects such collections of economic products and ‘art-ware’ bear witness to
the taxonomic mode of colonial knowledge production. Listing by material, classifying by
region, attempting to bring order into a botanic wilderness, they demonstrate the
movement from the collection to the list, to the exhibition catalogue, to the guidebook or
dictionary, and finally to the museum.

Empire in the twenty-first century is characterised by the very same vision of
consumption of other cultures through its obsession with the encyclopaedic or universal
museum.
The hallmark of a critical researcher is that they are conscious both, of their own
embeddedness of in a socio-historical milieu as well as the bases on which conventional
ideas about scholarship rest. Margaret Davies views this as an enquiry into “what are the
norms of ‘good’ scholarship, where do these derive from in cultural or political terms, on
what basis can they be defended, and how should they be challenged or reformed?84”
Being a researcher situated in the global south informs the vantage point from which I
pose these questions. Being a researcher situated in a country which is rich in tangible
and intangible cultural heritage has empowered me to grasp the complexities of issues
but also challenged me to be more aware of my subjectivities.
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Davies further elaborates that “Western knowledge has conventionally attributed
‘objectivity’ only to Western observers, who are typically also male – to highlight these
associations and to ask whether there are knowledge practices other than those put
forward by traditional ‘objective’ scholarship which might be more cognisant of the nonWestern non-male other, poses a challenge to the myth that subject and object are
separate”85.
In the chapters that follow, the preponderance of Eurocentric episteme on the definition
of heritage and formulation of strategies for its conservation is examined. William St.
Clair has studied in depth the damage sustained by the Elgin Marbles86 through the
restorations efforts of the British museum in 1937 and 1938 – efforts which were inspired
by “the aesthetic of white marble purity that is the idée fixe of neoclassicism”87. Similar
case studies by scholars in museology, archaeology and law have documented the
operation and impact of epistemic dominance in diverse contexts.
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Chapter 3
Protecting Cultural Heritage: Game Theory
Chapter Highlights


Rational choice via game theory has been widely employed in International
Relations research and has influenced both realists and liberal institutionalists



Game theory is useful in understanding the illicit global trade in antiquities and
explain the premises of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property 1970



The possibilities of regulation on the demand side (market countries) and supply
side (source countries) can both be critically examined using rational choice



Recognising the limits of the rational choice approach helps set the context for
human security and constructivism (forthcoming chapters)



A critique of rational choice analysis in International Relations helps ask how
considerations of justice – rather than exclusively those of order – might have a
place in systemic thinking
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Protecting cultural heritage: Game Theory Approach in International Relations
At the outset, let us heed a note of caution sounded by Margaret Davies88:
Like the conventional view of method, theory is abstraction, an exercise of scholarly power
over its objects -- objects which are tamed in the process of becoming understood.
This chapter delves into the global market for art and antiquities and applies the rational
choice lens favoured by realists to sketch the possibilities for international cooperation.
Such cooperation is already envisaged in international law, particularly by way of means
to restrict illegal cross-border flows.
Article 2 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970
1. The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export and
transfer of ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes of the
impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such
property and that international co-operation constitutes one of the most efficient
means of protecting each country's cultural property against all the dangers
resulting there from.
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2. To this end, the States Parties undertake to oppose such practices with the
means at their disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a stop
to current practices, and by helping to make the necessary reparations.
The next section reviews the insights that have emerged from the application of game
theory in International Relations.
Game Theory in International Relations
Game theory, otherwise known as interactive decision theory, suggests that an actor’s
decisions are influenced by the decisions that other actors in the situation could possibly
make. This catchy premise speaks to the quest of International Relations scholars for
rigorous frameworks within which to make sense of the actions of states. In the words of
Duncan Snidal, “conception of nation-states as interdependent, goal-seeking actors lies
at the heart of strategic game analysis, it is applicable across different issue areas”89. In
the prisoner’s dilemma game, the greatest gain is made by an actor if they defect while
the other actor cooperates. Thus game theory presupposes lack of harmony of interests
and encapsulates the tendency of actors not to cooperate, aligning itself closely with the
key assumptions of the realist International Relations view. In the structural realist
paradigm developed by Kenneth Waltz, “a true systemic explanation […] assumes that
structural elements dictate channels of actor interaction and ultimately determine the
outcomes of that interaction. The components of that structure, in turn, are threefold: an
ordering principle, the differentiation and functional specification of the units, and the
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distribution of capabilities across units”90. In this chapter, the global system through
which cultural objects are transacted will be analysed within this framework. The forces
which have historically permitted and continue to assist their transfer from where they
were originally found to where they came to be located will be reviewed. We will find
that international law on cultural property – its ownership and protection – has been
greatly concerned with the legitimacy of channels through which these objects move in
the global system.
Like the realist school, the game theory approach has concentrated its attention on
states as the important actor in the international system. And yet, Game Theory
transcends the conflict-centred realist paradigm to explore the nature and causes of
cooperation under anarchy. Snidal resolves this seeming contradiction thus: “No state
can choose its best strategy or attain its best outcome independent of choices made by
others. The related substantive implication is that national policy makers need to pursue
opportunities for cooperative interactions even as they seek to protect against
conflictual interactions”91. On the degrees of separation between Game Theory and
Realism, Snidal concludes that “by assuming that power maximizing states are the
principal actors, Game Theory subsumes the Realist position. But the game theoretic
approach is not coincident with Realism”92. Game theory exponents agree with realists
that structural factors constrain states but depart from them by making way for
voluntary decision-making.
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Benjamin Klasche and Peeter Selg identify key critiques of rational decision-making
forwarded by other paradigms in social science and applied to international relations.
According to them, approaches which privilege psychological analysis of international
relations “assume imperfect rationality based on the fluidity of identities, past beliefs and
groupthink”93. They also cite constructivists who view decision making as a product of
modes of subjectivity and beliefs and expectations about other actors. In recognising the
validity of these critiques as borne out by real world events, Klasche and Selg remind us
that game theory does not work well when the rules of the game change or certain
actors refuse to play by the rules and thereby they also embrace the sociological insight
that rationality is context-dependent and bounded.
Axelrod and Keohane provide a useful framework for evaluating behaviour of relevant
actors, including states, in an anarchic system. They focus on three variables – mutuality
of interests, the shadow of the future and the number of players – as framing the
context for cooperation or defection, in a classic prisoners’ dilemma game94. Rational
choice theorists have thus identified the compliance pull whereby, States concerned with
their reputation in international society might see it in their interest to uphold
international law rather than exercise hard power in contravention of it. According to
Harlan Grant Cohen, “Building reputation into game-theoretic models of how states
behave […] allows for the formulation of a comprehensive theory of international law
that includes treaties, soft law, customary international law, and norms. Perhaps most
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intriguingly, it helps explain opinio juris, the long-mysterious "psychological" element of
customary international law”95.
Staying true to the Rational Choice lineage of Game theory, the Demand and Supply sides
of the trade in Antiquities will be sketched below. The section will be concluded by a set
of questions and considerations, key to developing an approach to Heritage Protection
grounded in Game Theory.
Antiquities Trade: The Demand Side
In this section I review the prevailing situation in those parts of the world where cultural
goods are acquired, primarily by collectors and highly influential museums.
Describing trafficking in cultural goods as a “demand-driven crime”, Leila Aminedolleh
argues that “there is a well-documented link between the demand for looted items and
museums”96. Further explaining the role of museums she adds that “purchasing illicit
objects, museums fuel the market, thus motivating robbers to steal and destroy art
objects”.
The willingness of collectors and museums to expend significant sums of money on the
acquisition of prized artefacts sets up the incentive structure for downstream
participants in the trade. In his paper “The Fifth Column within the Archaeological Realm:
The Great Divide”, Oscar Muscarella places museums and collectors at the uppermost
echelons of what he terms The Plunder Culture. Elaborating on the intervening systemic
factors he says that “for museum curators, some are archaeologists, others art
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historians, the “acquisition” of antiquities is a major component of their job description,
for which raises and promotions reward them”97. Acquisition of artworks and antiquities
by museums from dealers and galleries of questionable repute is well-documented in the
literature. Asif Efrat sums up this phenomenon as follows98:
Since the antiquities market has traditionally not required revealing a record of ownership
history or original findspot of an object; and, furthermore, given the principle of vendor
anonymity, looted antiquities may obtain a veneer of legitimacy when they are sold by
dealers and auction houses. Illegally excavated and exported, antiquities often change
hands several times before being purchased by institutional or private collectors, and any
details of their illegal origin are erased or lost in the process. Once published in a sales
catalogue, an exhibition catalogue, or an academic paper, the antiquities acquire a new and
respectable pedigree and are effectively laundered.
Jessica Dietzler draws attention to two further important features of the antiquities
trade: first, demand stems from a very limited, wealthy section of the population
compared to other illicit trades such as drugs and weapons and second, the goods
undergo a massive increase in value while making the transition from source to demand
countries, estimated at as much as 100 fold by UNESCO99. On a related note, Erik Nemeth
observes that “As a market dynamic, looting of cultural artefacts also inspires collecting
of a disappearing commodity, which increases the profitability of trafficking in
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antiquities”100. The licit trade in cultural objects itself being clandestine in nature, allows
for illegally acquired objects to be made to seem legally traded down the chain of
transactions. In an abstract sense, trade in cultural objects converts them from heritage
that is “given value” to commodities that “have value”.
According to the non-profit Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE), the United States is a
major market for Chinese antiquities with the number of museums with collections
numbering 47. Describing the toll taken by illegal excavations and the soaring
international demand for finds, SAFE reports that “during most of the 20th century there
was a real sense of duty to report finds to the authorities. The lucrative gains from
supplying the demand of the international illicit antiquities trade in the last 20 years have
eroded this sense of national responsibility. The forgery industry prospers as a result of
the high demand for Chinese antiquities101.”
Regulation on the demand side
Setting the context for the regulation of the antiquities trade in market countries, Simon
Mackenzie writes102:
“Apart from a small and relatively localised cohort of archaeologists, the issue of looted
antiquities has not fired the public imagination in the demand nations and accordingly
there is little political value there in allocating resources to strategies of criminalisation.
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Public apathy in this case creates power in the trade by rendering it less visible on the
political regulatory landscape.”
It is therefore unsurprising that instances where regulation has taken place have been
fraught with resistance and clash of interests. Mackenzie describes the pushback against
regulation as a process of “mobilisation of the various other forms of capital mentioned
(financial, social, legal, political) which bring the power to make influential
representations in the regulatory debate to fend off or dilute any proposed intrusion
when the light of law enforcement sweeps across transactions, revealing shady corners”,
once it is found that the sanctity attributed to the cultural sector has eroded amid
revelations of wrongdoing.
“As institutions that receive tax benefits for their non-profit status, museums must be
held to a heightened standard of due diligence”, writes Aminedolleh, adding that failure
to do so amounts indirectly to public funding of “illicit and terrorism-linked activities”103.
The State of New York’s 1973 Act to prohibit and prevent illicit import, export and/or
transfer of ownership of cultural property within New York State finds that “interchange
of cultural property among states and nations for scientific, cultural and educational
purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization, enriches the cultural life of all
peoples, and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among states and nations”104. The
Act also recognizes the responsibility of all states to protect their own cultural heritage
and respect that of all other states and nations.
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During Congressional hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, on H.R.
5643, representatives presented the following recommendations on the bill on behalf of
the State Department:



The restriction of entering solely into bilateral agreements with other states for
addressing illicit trade in cultural property be relaxed



Instead of a statutory committee to advise the President on related matters, ad
hoc committees be established as appropriate to the field of art and
archaeological expertise in question



Measures be taken to ensure that the provision to allow entry of an object in the
US if it has been away from the source country for more than 10 years are not
exploited, including notice to the country of origin in such cases to allow it to
pursue legal remedies



Once an object has been on display in a US museum for 10 years, such object be
immune from seizure or forfeiture thereafter

These deliberations give a glimpse into the mind set which informs regulation in a market
country where the goal is to balance the interests of domestic constituencies with the
demands of international cooperation. The Museum community in the US has routinely
voiced three main concerns in response to any attempts to regulate the illicit trade in
antiquities by law:
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That the cultural and educational interests of the American public will suffer if
acquisitions by museums are made more cumbersome



That the US will be affected disproportionately if other market countries do not
opt for similar regulatory practices



That the burden of heritage protection should be equitably shared by source
countries as well.

Miles suggests that “the record among American museums is mixed but improving: some
such as the University of Pennsylvania Museum, stopped buying antiquities without
extensive documentation in 1970, in accordance with the UNESCO agreement of that
year; the Getty Museum declared its respect for the agreement in 2006.105” She finds that
the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art has not amended its practices in this regard
and the view that “the encyclopedic museums’ needs should override the claims of
nations to retain their heritage” continues to find regular expression from quarters
within the community.
Self-imposed import restrictions are an important mechanism for market countries to
help stem illegal flows. By way of example, Fincham describes the process following
which source countries might seek cooperation from designated agencies in the United
States. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC)106 advises the President on
requests for bilateral agreements made by any State Party to the UNESCO 1970
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Convention107. If the CPAC finds that cultural property located in the source country is at
risk of looting; the source country has taken adequate measures to protect its own
cultural property; if applied, the import restrictions will have a significant effect; and no
other remedies are available to achieve the same effect, then, import restrictions may be
enacted.
Section 303 3 D of the Act states that108
…the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 307 in the particular
circumstances is consistent with the general interest of the international community in the
interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural, and educational
purposes
The Act also recognises imposition of similar restrictions by other importing countries as
an important factor which is indicative of a quintessential prisoner’s dilemma mindset
where, decisions of other actors in the game matter.
Some have argued whether regulations on the supply side amount to taking on the
responsibility of protecting their own heritage from source countries. In a way, this poses
a dilemma similar to what plagues international negotiations on emissions reductions
intended to mitigate climate change. The question in either case remains: Does more
power and affluence entail greater responsibility?
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The notorious case of the collector and curator Marion True who worked at the J. Paul
Getty Museum in the United States from 1986 until 2005 is worthy of mention here. As
curator, True had a chequered record of acquiring unprovenanced material, identifying
and refusing to acquire such material as well as demonstrating some readiness for
repatriation in certain cases. In addition, she was reported to be involved in questionable
personal financial dealings with antiquities collectors. Eventually, True was charged and
prosecuted both in Italy and Greece as follows:


In 2005 “True was charged in Italy with receiving stolen antiquities and conspiring
with dealers Robert Hecht and Giacomo Medici to receive stolen antiquities, and
she was ordered to stand trial in Rome […]. The trial commenced on 16
November 2005, and was abandoned without verdict on 13 October 2010 as the
limitation period on True’s alleged offences expired”109.



In 2006 “Greek prosecutors charged True in connection with the fourth-century
BC gold funerary wreath acquired in 1993, which was by then believed to have
been taken out of Greece illegally […]. In November 2007, her trial was ended
without resolution after the expiry of the statute of limitations”110.

Commenting on the real motivation behind the True trial, former Italian prosecutor Paolo
Ferri is reported to have remarked: “To show an example of what Italy could do”111.
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Antiquities Looting: The Supply Side
In this section, illegal excavation and trade of antiquities is discussed in the context of
war as well as in a peace-time scenario.
Below, a step-by-step account into how the trade begins in ISIS controlled regions and
continues beyond is paraphrased:
Metal detectors are used to locate antiquities buried underground. Satellite imagery has
allowed mapping of the extent of excavations. The Wall Street Journal estimates that the
looting generates USD 88million in revenues annually for ISIS112. In addition, antiquities
are used as bribes for facilitating cross border movement of individuals and as barter in
exchange for weapons. The Antiquities division of ISIS has been issuing permits to locals
to carry out excavations. Locals trying to earn a living dig up antiquities under ISIS
supervision. Once obtained, ISIS engages a network of experts to verify authenticity of
items and determine their value. They charge traders a 20 per cent tax on all items sold.
At the next stage, the antiquities are sold to middle-men in countries like Turkey and
Lebanon. These middle-men have the expertise to both channel the antiquities onto
international markets as well as launder them through the system, until they arrive at
their final destinations in Western Europe and the United States. Social media sites have
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been a useful tool for dealers to make the availability of antiquities known to prospective
buyers.
Neil Brodie writes that neither the 1974 domestic law prohibiting export of
archaeological material not the 1990 United nations Security Council Resolution 661,
prevented large scale looting and export of cultural goods in Iraq during wars in the
1990s and 2000s113. Brodie’s investigative and statistical work provides insight into certain
key features of the supply side of the market:


Auction houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s have profited immensely from the
sale of antiquities. With reference to objects smuggled or legally exported from
Iraq, we find their sales trends responsive to price fluctuations. Brodie writes that
“the profits being made by Christie’s from cylinder seal sales started increasing in
the late 1980s, and stayed at a high level until 2002, when they declined sharply”,
somewhat contemporaneously with the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1483.



While this decline in profits meant that objects from Iraq receded from the
catalogue pages of the auction houses, the trade gradually moved online, leading
to the emergence of a new supply-side entity. The internet market is
characterised by fly-by-night operators unobstructed by reputational concerns,
lower levels of scrutiny by experts compared to known auction houses and recent
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attempts to engage the academic community to combat the proliferation of
fakes.


Another important supply side actor is the academic expert whose authentication
and endorsement “support a credible pricing regime by establishing the quality,
interest and rarity of pieces on offer, and maintain customer confidence by
keeping the market free of fakes”114.

Dietzler applies Marcus Felson’s Routine Activity Theory to the illicit antiquities trade,
whereby, the framing is in terms of a series of actions encompassing “the criminal
elements and organizational structure and sequence of antiquities trafficking”115, yielding
“a broad chartable view of the entire process”. This framework draws attention to “the
settings on which actors converge, as opposed to focusing on the actors themselves”,
making it a useful way of conceptualising the supply side. Dietzler further argues that
such framing allows us to discuss the illicit trade in cultural goods, as a form of
trafficking, as both organised and criminal.
Part of the reason threats faced by heritage sites have intensified is the public policies of
source countries themselves, most notably the pressure to expand physical
infrastructure. For instance, Monalisa Maharjan has documented how lack of fulfilment
of legitimate development needs of people in Nepal have led to perception of world
heritage sites as a liability116. In his review of the Environmental (Protection) Act of India,
1986, Rana PB Singh recognises the tussle between a historically oriented approach –
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espoused by the Archaeological Survey of India – and the broad, forward looking stance
of the Town and Country Planning Organisation, exemplifying the complexity of goals
and considerations characterising heritage conservation in urban and rapidly urbanising
contexts117. In addition to the location of heritage sites in urban areas, Singh lists
infrastructure development to support tourism and a lack of awareness about
conservation needs as outstanding challenges.
In 2006 the New York Times reported Ma Weidu, founder of Guanfu private museum, as
suggesting that the exclusive emphasis on developmental priorities had recently shifted
to make room for measures to minimize harm caused to ancient sites118. The
constructivist framework discussed in chapter five allows us to return to the question of
a model of heritage conservation based on a tourism economy.
Regulation of the supply side
Source countries have been criticized by opponents of regulation of open market access
to cultural items for:


Failing to take adequate measures within their borders to safeguard cultural
property and expecting market countries to shoulder the responsibility.



Diverting cultural heritage towards pursuit of nationalistic agendas rather than
allowing it to serve the cause of intercultural understanding as the common
heritage of humanity.
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One of the forms that looting prevention measures have taken in source countries is the
creation of special security units such as the Italian Carabinieri. However, even with such
commitment of resources, it has been found that the presence of archaeological sites
being widespread, defies one hundred per cent security coverage. This is why supply side
regulation has had to take the form of strict patrimony laws providing for post-looting
sanctions and possibilities of restitution. And this also explains why Italy’s “unique
property laws entitle the government to assert ownership rights to any item dug up from
a citizen’s land” which “severely limit the permanent export of antiquities”119. Nicole Klug
discusses the approach taken by Japan as less restrictive. The legal framework there is a
combination of a limited register of objects under state protection, accompanied by
“unregistered works of comparable age and quality” which may be exported or
exchanged120.
In recent years, source countries – Italy being a leading example – have stepped up
demands for repatriation of objects holding great cultural and historical significance.
Thanks to these efforts, their “position has won broad moral support and increasingly
become the norm among academic archaeologists, who see ancient objects as historic
artefacts inseparable from their place of discovery”121. While a shift in normative
paradigm is not accounted for in the game theory/realist approach, the impact of such a
change is felt on the demand side by putting museums and collectors under greater
pressure to revisit their acquisition practices.
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Patrick Howlett-Martin expresses the core sentiment behind the calls for return and
repatriation of stolen and illegally removed cultural objects in these words122:
The acquaintance with a culture, the achievement of a kind of relationship with a past
civilization is obviously easier in situ. There is something inauthentic about a Westerner
looking at an African sculpture or an Egyptian artwork in a Western museum that feels
often compelled to build a fake scenery to display the pieces such as the Pergamonmuseum
in Berlin with architectural structures from Greek and Roman Antiquity reconstructed.
Showing objects in glass cases in museums is to denude them of their « sacred » meanings
[…]”.

Evaluation
The game theory approach, which is founded in microeconomic fundamentals of firm
and market behaviour, is useful towards grasping the trade in antiquities. Much of the
flow of cultural goods globally, has been understood to take place between source
countries who are richly endowed with these objects and market countries where
wealthy collectors and the museums which eventually house the traded goods are
situated. Treatment of the problem through a market-driven approach, however, is not
independent of normative considerations. Au contraire, the case of cultural goods in
particular, forces us to pay attention to the hierarchies and asymmetries that sustain the
global trading system at large. According to Simon Mackenzie, “The moral argument laid
out by archaeological commentators has become the object of much legal writing, and
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drafting, and the policy landscape at both the national level – in source and market
countries – and the international level, is now characterised by many legal controls
including notable international conventions (UNESCO 1970; UNIDROIT 1995), national
generic criminal laws that have been applied to illicit dealing in antiquities (such as the
National Stolen Property Act in the US) and criminal laws specific to dealing in looted
antiquities such as the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 in the UK.123” And
yet, concentrating exclusively on the illegal antiquities trade between source and market
countries, from a supply and demand standpoint, yields a framework with limited
applicability and certain inherent limitations.
It is increasingly clear that the line between source and destination regions cannot be
clearly delineated in present times. Due to the transnational nature of the trade in
question, the network of suppliers, intermediaries and consumers is diffuse and crosscutting. For instance, entities such as museums and auction houses, although based in
market countries, operate, respectively, on the demand and supply sides of the market.
Similarly, museums within universities are demand-side entities while academics working
within those same institutions contribute to the supply side. Thus, the microeconomic
analysis ingrained in game theory shows that there is no perfect overlap between the
legal category of market country with the demand side and the legal category of source
country with the supply side. Similarly, it is incorrect to say that source countries are
necessarily “conflict-ridden”, “war-torn” or “unstable” – the sort of language frequently
used in internationalist arguments. Based on a survey of studies, Jessica Dietzler
establishes that the “problem of looted or stolen antiquities is most damaging in
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politically conflicted and economically depressed regions but is not isolated to conflict
regions alone; in fact, there are a number of politically and economically (relatively)
stable countries that also experience theft of archaeological materials for profit; notably
England, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland.124”
In practice, this delinking of categories gives rise to a sanctioning problem as defectors
are not easily identifiable and it is difficult to ensure that sanctions are targeted. Similarly,
the so-called “shadow of the future” is long since the effects of loss of cultural property
only become evident over a longer time horizon. Alessandro Chechi points out a further
important feature of the market whereby “objects of licit or illicit provenance pass
through the same intermediaries – such as auction houses, antiques dealers and galleries
– and that in the art market licit and illicit antiquities are mixed” and argues that such
mixing results in an “opportunity to launder the proceeds of crimes and hence the cover
for wrongdoers to evade criminal responsibility”125.
For an effective conservation regime to be built around this approach, two key
considerations matter:


Current bifurcation in applicable body of laws and academic discourse between
source countries and destination countries would have to be replaced by an
alternative paradigm that more closely approximates the evolving landscape.



The shadow of the future would need to be shortened by ensuring that the
effects of loss of heritage are felt in the short-run. This is best achieved by tying
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heritage protection more rigorously with post-conflict reconstruction, which is
where it becomes useful to apply the human security paradigm to this discussion.
International relations scholars like Kenneth Abbott, Duncan Snidal and Robert Keohane
have drawn on game theory to define what purpose international organisations, viewed
as “regimes”, play in the international system. While structural realists like Kenneth
Waltz write off international organisations as instruments of powerful states, the regime
theorists set themselves the task of identifying how international organisations
constitute inter-state interactions in specific ways. Observing that rational functionalism
shares the emphasis on interests with realism, Beth Simmons underlines the absence of
realist cynicism in the former’s worldview126. Instead, rational functionalism posits that
international law often stems from states rationally calculating the undesirable outcomes
that might result from the absence of its constraints. In Slaughter Burley’s assessment,
regime theorists modify structural realism in contending that “institutions that provide
valuable information must […] be factored into systemic explanations of state behaviour
independently of structure”127. Regime theories exemplify the potential of
interdisciplinary dialogue between International Relations and International Law.
Slaughter Burley also notes that by recasting international law within the rational choice
framework, regime theorists not only bridged the realist-idealist ends of the spectrum
but also made an argument in favour of adoption of international law in domestic legal
systems on grounds of efficiency and transparency.
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Amitav Acharya has identified three prominent characteristics of the system in the
realists’ systemic thinking:


Pre-Westphalian international systems are largely ignored



The dominant template is the classical Mediterranean of Greek and Roman times



The history of war and conquest is well documented while “Interactions
anchored on trade, ideas (including political ideas) and culture, where
empire, hegemony or explicit and continuous power balancing is
absent, have been ignored”128

Analysing the movement of cultural goods and the consumption and exchange of
heritage through the international system helps partly address these imbalances. As a
case, it is possible to examine heritage destruction both in conflict and in peace, as I do in
this study.
In forthcoming chapters, analysis from the lenses of human security and constructivism
reveals the far reaching effects of the dominance of military affairs and Eurocentric
thinking in the evolution of international law.
As explained in chapter two, realism greatly emphasizes the distribution of power in the
system and this is why, moments of power redistribution or the emergence and decline
of powers are of great import. According to a McKinsey report, “the Art Basel and UBS
global Art Market Report 2018 found that in 2017, China accounted for 21 percent of the
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$63 billion global art market, second only to the United States”129. Recent participation of
China and emerging markets in general in the international heritage trade could give us a
glimpse into how ascendency to great power and hegemonic status influences actor
behaviour.
Derek Fincham suggests that the merits of nationalist and internationalist views on
ownership, location and protection of cultural property should be debated from the
standpoint of distributive justice. He writes130:
In applying ideas of distributive justice to cultural heritage, we can arrive at a mutually
beneficial set of principles and ideas which can, ideally, balance the concerns of cultural
internationalists, who value the idea of universal museums and the dissemination of works
of art, with the enforcement of legitimate legal restrictions on the theft of heritage, the
looting of archaeological sites, and the destruction of knowledge. Even groups wanting the
return of their heritage only want to achieve justice.
Travelling exhibitions and international loan agreements have been suggested as ways to
balance the interests of countries of origin and a global audience. Elsewhere, I have
argued in favour of a travelling exhibition as a satisfactory resolution to recurring public
debate in India about the repatriation of the Kohinoor diamond131. Such a step, I find, will:
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Keep alive the memory of empire and its ravages to serve as learning for future
generations
Address the challenge of resource allocation for the upkeep of the diamond in India,
amid competing priorities
Sidestep what some would argue to be the controversial claim of a nation-state to an
object which has changed hands a number of times before the State came into existence.
Serve the interest of the global community in enjoying access to a precious stone and a
contested fragment of history
Derek Fincham writes that even in the absence of laws addressing illegal trade in source
countries, “native cultures have successfully used ethical claims, using social justice to
successfully repatriate objects wrongfully removed from their context”. Native cultures
often in conflict with domestic laws anyway and this phenomenon observed by Fincham
allows us to:
Study international cooperation in the absence of law but with reference to a claim for
justice
Usefully problematize the realist claims that States are the only important actors in the
international system and as an actor, the State is a monolith without any contradictory
internal pulls
Begin to imagine how considerations of justice – rather than exclusively those of order –
might have a place in systemic thinking
As noted above, reputational concerns contribute towards making compliance with
international law a rational choice for States. However, in the case of the global market
79

of cultural goods, until recently, there was a lot of reputational gain to be made by
disregarding the law and become a major market country. As we saw above in case of
the True trial, the recourse to prosecution was a step taken by a source nation (Italy) for
the demonstrative effect it would have on targeted adversaries in market countries. Also,
the game theory model does not account for the disparities in the capacity of States to
comply with international law. Therefore, the rational choice framework and lessons
drawn when it is applied to the international system, alone are insufficient to illuminate
the many threats to cultural heritage and the range of efforts directed at its
conservation. The forthcoming chapters attempt to present a more complete picture by
drawing on the paradigms of human security and constructivism from International
Relations132.
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Chapter 4
Protecting Cultural Heritage: The Human Security Paradigm
Chapter Highlights


The human security paradigm rose to prominence in the post-Cold War period as
interstate warfare receded and concerns over non-conventional threats to
security grew



Whether human security is useful and actionable in it thick or thin conception has
been a matter of debate



Broadly it has been discussed with reference to aspirations of freedom from fear
and freedom from want



Applying the human security framework to understand the toll taken by
destruction of heritage reveals that future prospects are an important element of
our sense of security



It is observed that those military interventions which have deployed the rhetoric
of human security in the past couple of decades have neglected and failed to
protect heritage sites



It is argued based on the analysis that freedom from trauma is an important facet
which should be added to the definition of human security so as to more fully
address the causes and impact of conflict
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“There is no small irony in hearing that American museums became havens of spiritual
nourishment following the attacks of September 11th 2001. By way of contrast, one of
the most immediate consequences of the invasion of Iraq was the transformation of its
national museum from peaceful oasis into desecrated battleground as American forces
sought to spread the “ideals of democracy””133, writes Tom Flynn, plainly setting out the
complex and variegated repercussions that war, insecurity and conflict have for heritage
and cultural practice. According to Chinkin and Kaldor the element of use of force
inherent in guaranteeing human security was an outgrowth of European wars of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and is inapplicable to the New Wars of today.
However, the influence of said European wars over international law endures.
Substantiating this influence, Craig Forrest goes as far as to argue that “the need for a
balance between the considerations of humanity and the military actions necessary to
win a war is regarded as defining the very nature of international humanitarian law”134.
The notion of human security itself is premised on the immediate post-Cold War
optimism about the universality of liberal democratic ideals which has proven to be
misplaced135. Chinkin and Kaldor argue that International law was aimed at mitigating
suffering in war but in doing so, has legitimized war. They call for a reconceptualization
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of human security that brings prohibition of war back in focus. This also means extending
the concept of crimes against humanity to include attacks on States even if they are
conducted by other States. These authors also recap the on-going debate on the relative
merits of broad and narrow conceptions of human security, with the former
encompassing material security while the latter is limited to physical security. Summed
up in their words, the main critique levelled against the two approaches is as follows136:
Those who favour the broad version have argued that the narrow version is too
concentrated on military intervention, while those who favour the narrow version have
argued that the broad version is indistinguishable from development and covers too much
ground to be analytically useful.
A typical conceptualisation of a broad understanding of human security is seen first in the
1994 Human Development Report which added the paradigm of security into its study of
development. The report reads: “The concept of security has for too long been
interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection
of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear
holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers
were locked in an ideological struggle-fighting a cold war all over the world. “137 The
UNDP defined human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease
and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of
daily life,” thus broadening the conceptualisation of security. Defining human security as
“safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection
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from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,” the UNDP broadened
the conceptualisation of security. 138

The justification of a broad definition is best provided for in the foreword in “Human
Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace” written by
former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anan - “During the cold war, security tended to
be defined almost entirely in terms of military might and the balance of terror. Today, we
know that ‘security’ means far more than the absence of conflict. We also have a greater
appreciation for nonmilitary sources of conflict. We know that lasting peace requires a
broader vision encompassing areas such as education and health, democracy and human
rights, protection against environmental degradation, and the proliferation of deadly
weapons. We know that we cannot be secure amidst starvation, that we cannot build
peace without alleviating poverty, and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of
injustice. These pillars of what we now understand as the people-centered concept of
‘human security’ are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.”
Tatah Mentan offers the following definition of human security which represents it as a
peace-time project designed to mitigate the very causes of conflict139:
…human security advocates for inclusive policies that strengthen social cohesion and
rejects exclusionary policies and practices that result in an unequal allocation of economic,
political, and cultural rights among identity groups and that also, if left unattended, can
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lead to social exclusion, proliferation of networks of discontent, and possibly higher
incidence of conflict.
Addressing the lack of consensus on a definition of human security, David Roberts
proposes specifying what constitutes human insecurity, “to represent avoidable civilian
deaths, global in reach, that are caused by changeable human-built social, political,
economic, cultural or belief structures, created, inhabited and operated by other civilians
whose work or conduct, indirectly and/or directly, unintentionally, unnecessarily and
avoidably causes needless mortality around the world”140.
To sum up, human security paradigm is centered on the individual, is cosmopolitan to the
extent that it critiques the insecurity fostered by forces of globalization and is built
around the pillars of freedom from fear and freedom from want.
Evolution
Human security came into being as a concept only after the close of the cold war.141 With
the end of the cold war came a general acknowledgement that the traditional modes of
understanding security through a “realist, state centric paradigm”142 were inadequate.
Mary Kaldor traces the origins of the idea to Conference on Security Cooperation in
Europe’s 1975 Helsinki Agreement. According to her, “by emphasising the security of
individuals rather than states, human security implies a commitment to human rights but
it does not deny the importance of the more traditional state centre”143.
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The concept of human security came into focus once again with the Human
Development Report of 1994. The Human Development Report of 2001 furthered this
concept which called for the formation of the Commission for human Security (CHS).144
The formation of the commission was chiefly on the lines of UN Secretary-General’s call
at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear”.
The purpose of the said commission was to
(i) mobilize support and promote greater understanding of human security,
(ii) develop further the concept as an operational tool, and
(iii) outline a concrete action plan for its implementation.145
When the 2004 Barcelona report, we see a new way of looking at human security given
that it suggests that in the modern world, individuals from across the world face
significant threat of violence. Much of this violence, however, is not resultant of state or
military action. A prime threat in the modern world are terrorist organizations which are
not representative of state or military interests. Moreover, military action cannot
conveniently suppress such acts of violence for
(1) Military cannot be expediently deployed to insecure areas.146
(2) Military action is meant for usage in battlefields and not over areas inhabited by
civilians. Military action used to suppress such local security issues can in turn cause
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further insecurity (as in the case of Syria where American bombs targeting enemies
affect civilian populations)
On 10 September, 2012, the United Nations General Assembly adopted General Assembly
Resolution 66/290 entitled “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005
World Summit Outcome” in which Member States agreed on a common understanding
on human security147.The UN Human Security Unit’s 2014-17 Strategic Plan identifies as its
basis, two key building blocks of the concept148:
1. The application of human security derives much of its strength from a dual policy
framework based on the mutually reinforcing pillars of protection and
empowerment. Application of this framework offers a comprehensive approach that
combines top-down norms, processes and institutions with a bottom-up focus in
which participatory processes support the important role of people as actors in
defining and implementing their essential freedoms.
2. Human security is best safeguarded through proactive and preventive actions to
current and emerging threats. By examining how the particular constellations of
threats to individuals and communities can translate into broader insecurities,
human security promotes the development of early warning mechanisms that help
to mitigate the impact of current threats and, where possible, prevent the
occurrence of future threats.
Scholarship emerging from a non-western lens has tended to mobilise the human
security framework to draw attention to the linkages between neoliberal globalization
147
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and non-conventional security challenges, particularly in resource-rich parts of the world.
According to Mentan, “Global demand for particular commodities, such as timber,
diamonds and drugs, has provided the funds that have allowed warring factions to
sustain fighting over many years. The cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, etc. are eloquent
examples.149” Mary Kaldor has similarly drawn parallels between the erosion of decision
making at the national level caused by the market fundamentalist structural adjustment
paradigm and heightened global levels of insecurity150. Such insecurity is at times
reminiscent of Cold War dynamics while also defying simplistic rendering in conventional
geostrategic rivalries.
Debates and criticisms
The key debate that emerged post the Human Development Report of 1994, was
regarding whether Security was to be viewed narrowly (in terms of solely physical
security) or whether the definition of the same should be broadened (to other elements
of human development).
King and Murray have described the birth of the concept of human security as a “unifying
event” – it works as an “organizing concept” that enables the development of broad
coalitions around specific ‘security’ issues without the traditional strains of narrowed,
state-centric definitions of security that have previously hindered multi-party
cooperation.151 In a similar vein, both Jolly and Ray 152(2006: 13-14) and Tadjbakhsh and
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Chenoy 153(2007: 10) advocate a holistic approach to human security definition, arguing
that the post-Cold War world presents such a plethora of security problems, where the
sources of threat vary widely both within and across states, that a flexible, broad
definition of human security is the only viable option. “Not only does a holistic approach
draw different specialisms together in the quest to understand better the
interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity,” writes Ewan, “it may
also bolster co-operation between international agencies in the fields of security,
development and human rights.”154
One of the key criticisms levelled against the concept of human security is its lack of
clear, universal definition.155 Roland Paris argues that the concept of human security can
be closely likened to the concept of sustainable development. Similarly, Edward Newman
calls it “normatively attractive but analytically weak.”156
Consequently, the proponents of a narrow definition argue that a broad definition would
take away from the focus of physical security. For instance, according to Khong, by
broadening the concept of security to encompass anything from environmental
degradation and pollution to homelessness and unemployment, we would be prioritizing
everything.157
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A different line of criticism comes from those who contend that states have been able to
co-opt the human security narrative to further their own ends, augmenting hegemonic
interests and narratives rather than challenging or transforming them.158 Instead of
having genuine commitment to the emancipation of the most vulnerable and
impoverished, Suhrke has argued that non-military “middle powers” such as Norway,
Japan, and Canada have used the promulgation of the human security agenda to cement
their own places in the international state system.159 Taking a critical perspective on the
development of the concept, Booth argues that human security has taken the image of
“the velvet glove on the iron hand of power,” criticising how “the cold monster of the
sovereign state has appropriated human security in order to help entrench its own.”160 It
doesn’t give a voice to the previously ‘marginalized’, as scholars such as Conteh-Morgan
have suggested.161 Instead, Western powers have privatised aid and development
agencies and a particularly troubling issue has arisen where the security and
development of “those over there” is seen as only a means towards the security of “us
over here”.162
Tara McCormack argues that:
“[The human security discourse]… potentially allows powerful states or international
institutions greater freedom to intervene in and regulate weaker states in a number of
different ways. This serves to disempower the citizens of weak or impoverished states.
Whilst their own state is held up to greater scrutiny and regulation by the international
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community – purportedly on their behalf – the citizens of those states do not have the
means by which to control or hold to account major international institutions or powerful
states.”163
Thus human security can also be seen as a tool in the hands of the developed states to
influence the sovereign functions of the weaker states. Moreover, with the new
paradigm of human security, often, weaker states are presented as existential threats to
the most powerful states.164
McCormack suggests that the concept of human security evolved during the post-Cold
War period of disengagement from developing countries by great powers and this is why
it delinks development from security165. Recounting some prominent critiques of human
security, she further notes:
“For Duffield and other authors, human security can be understood as a regulatory
power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and
economic processes that constitute a human population. […] In this reading the West
seeks to assert control over the developing world in order to protect itself from disorder
emanating from the South.166”
Human Security and Cultural Heritage
Applying the concept of human security to cultural property conservation in conflict
zones, one is operating in a context of people-to-people war and isolating as its enduring
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feature, the targeting of civilians. Referring to heritage as “the ultimate expression and
footprint of a society”, Watfa Shadi and Mustafa Bashar argue that “to inflict damage to
the heritage of a country is to damage the soul and identity of the people themselves”167.
Bearing in mind that “an individual’s current security is a function of her or his future
prospects”168, allows us to fully capture the psychological impact that the social
dislocation caused by destruction of heritage can have. This is also to say that heritage
and cultural practices are not only significant in terms of preserving the past but also
must be valued as contributing factors to future well-being. For its success, the human
security approach relies on coordinated action of state and non-state entities at the local,
national and international level, enabling an interplay of the varied associations with the
idea of heritage. This approach also takes due cognizance of the fact that more often
than not, actors trained in combat and other conventional dimensions of security are illequipped to shoulder the responsibility of protecting heritage.
At present, most discussion on “protection of civilians” is based on a narrow definition of
civilian and a thin conception of protection. The definition of civilian can be seen as
narrow for the following reason: It is hard to distinguish between
combatants/aggressors, many of whom may be in and out of civilian life over the span of
conflict and the civilian population, which is purportedly at risk from them. Destruction of
heritage sites in Syria shows that it is far from easy to separate parties to the conflict into
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watertight categories of those who are attacking and those who are protecting heritage.
Reporting on the situation in Syria, Michael D. Danti writes169:
Combat damage and looting are widespread in Syria, and all major combatants (state,
quasi-state, and non-state) are responsible for acts of theft and destruction to varying
degrees. Intentional destructions of heritage places by ISIL and other Jihadi-Salafi
organizations (Meijer 2013: 24–29; Steinburg 2013) – mainly tombs, cemeteries, mosques,
churches, temples, and shrines sacred to Shia, Christians, Sufis, Jews, Druse, Alawi, Yezidis,
and Mandaeans – across northern Iraq and Syria are perhaps the highest impact cultural
property crimes given their explicit purposes of eradicating cultural diversity, inspiring
terror, fuelling sectarian tensions, and fomenting further violence.
The conception of protection can be adjudged as thin concerned almost exclusively with
keeping people alive. This may be viewed in contrast to a thick conception of protection
in the sense of minimizing the impact of the conflict on civilian life. The more broadbased conception of protection has a short-term and a long term advantage. In the shortrun it reduces the incentives for individuals to take up combat as an occupation or to
perform other services for conflict entrepreneurs. In the long-run it makes for a
smoother road to peace-building and transition to stability. The widening of social
cleavages due to cultural crimes would be avoided, making post-conflict restoration of
social trust less fraught. Disruption and internal displacement would be minimized and
individuals and communities would be optimistic of having a real chance of rebuilding
where they are rather than be forced to flee. This would minimize regional contagion of
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instability and other knock-on effects of refugee outflows from conflict zones that are
being experienced globally.
Kaldor describes the operative implications of a human security based national and
transnational governance paradigm in these words170:
We are used to thinking of internal security as the domain of law and policing and external
security as war and diplomacy. A human security approach implies that something like what
we take for granted internally has to apply externally as well.
Resituated within this framework, the concern with destruction of cultural heritage
becomes a problem not of specifying what protections are to be extended to heritage in
war-time but of finding mechanisms to resolve conflict without recourse to war.
A human security approach to conflict resolution needs also take into account those
global private economic interests which profit from weakening of state capacity or state
failure in resource rich parts of the world. Insights into the dynamics of the market for
cultural goods yielded by the game theory approach are thus placed within a broader
context of the systemic inequality and insecurity.
As we have seen, the human security approach lends itself well to understanding the
intricacies of destruction of heritage in conflict zones. Such an applied approach also
reveals an inherent contradiction in the conceptual framework of human security.
Freedom from fear and freedom from want have been recognized as key pillars of human
security. In conflict zones, however, these two motivations may be at cross purposes
with each other. Confronted by economic disruption and extreme deprivation, host
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communities turn to looting and pillaging of heritage in order to earn a living. “Given the
sometimes life-or-death situation for themselves and their families, the financial gains
achieved by stealing and smuggling their own cultural heritage creates an overwhelming
option”171, write Watfa and Mustafa, lucidly portraying the grim reality of conflict zones.
Fear of long term social consequences is a small consideration for them but is nothing
short of terrorizing to a worldwide cosmopolitan sensibility, in large part inspiring the
high profile, well publicized strikes on museums and ancient sites in Afghanistan and Iraq
in the first decade of the twenty first century. In this way, the human security framework
vests more responsibility in the international community to take a long term view on
heritage protection and interpret the conservation capacities of countries of origin in a
dynamic sense, rather than as a given. Despite being normative in nature, the human
security approach hinges on the economic value of cultural objects but in a different way
than the game theoretical approach. Where the analyses of both approaches converge is
in ascribing to international law the responsibility of pursuing equitable global
development rather that sustain the widening of inequalities in a bid to uphold the
edifice of neoliberal globalization at all costs. Powerful states have also deployed the
rhetoric of human security to conduct military operations in other parts of the world,
particularly emphasizing freedom from fear. Such military operations have in recent
history dealt significant damage to heritage sites and cultural objects.
At the epistemic level, Amitav Acharya traces the origins of “human-centric” approaches
to the Global South, making them a significant step forward in the direction of nonwestern International Relations scholarship. He is however critical of their appropriation
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by “western governments such as Canada and Norway” and expresses disappointment
with their inability to “challenge the centrality of the state”172.
Freedom from Trauma: Towards redefining human security
A conception of protecting cultural heritage based on human security is likely to suffer
from two of Philip Allott’s five main challenges to the future evolution of international
law173.
1. The Hegemony of the Economic
2. The Tyranny of the Actual
While explaining what he means by the “hegemony of the economic”, Allott questions
the assumed positive correlation between economic development and social
development and is critical of the association of public interest with capitalist, privateinterest driven economic activity. The human security paradigm seems to have coopted
Freedom from Want without addressing the basic underlying limitation that capitalism
and globalization exacerbate inequalities.
Allott also argues that “to rationalize or naturalise the human actual is to empty it of its
moral content, to neutarlise it”174. We see this done to a great degree when the human
security paradigm evaluates the harm caused to heritage against a static background of
conflict or in the contingency of war and its immediate aftermath. Here the opportunity
to think about conflict and reconstruction as long term processes is missed with the end
result that heritage is the loser since by definition it accrues more value over the longer
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horizon of time. Keeping these limitations in mind, I propose a revised understanding or
human security below which would elevate the potential of the framework to safeguard
cultural heritage.
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scurry writes, referring to the phenomenon of torture175:
But this reluctance, and the deep sense of tact in which it originates, increase our
vulnerability to power by ensuring that our moral intuitions and impulses, which come
forward so readily on behalf of human sentience, do not come forward far enough to be of
any help: we are most backward on behalf of things we believe in most in part because our
instincts salute the incommensurability of pain by preventing its entry into worldly
discourse.
In the concluding part of this chapter, I will discuss loss of heritage and one’s cultural
grounding as a form of trauma and propose that Freedom from Trauma should be given
place alongside Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want if the conception of Human
Security is to be responsive to our time.
Present day global conflicts need much more nuanced interpretation than the limited
categories of inter or intra state war might allow for. The individualisation brought about
by technologies of globalisation has also made it easier for those same individuals to rally
around causes, culminating in the ongoing instability that has been the saga of the
twenty first century thus far176. One less talked about feature of these conflicts is the
aggregation of intergenerational trauma which almost inexplicably erupts as if a dormant
volcano come alive. The Black Lives Matter Movement in the United States, the Me Too
175
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and Rhodes must fall movements globally share in common a painful reckoning with a
loss of agency and narrative control which until recently seemed to have been perfectly
normalised. Many have expressed bafflement at the polarisation that has ensued in the
wake of these movements. As Scurry explains, pain makes an “absolute claim for
acknowledgement” and because society is unused to the expression of pain, such a claim
tends to remain unacknowledged.
Scurry describes the trauma inflicted by the fallout of war poignantly:
“When Berlin is bombed, when Dresden is burned, there is a deconstruction not only of a
particular ideology but of the primary evidence of the capacity for self-extension itself:
one does not in bombing Berlin destroy only objects, gestures, and thoughts that are
culturally stipulates, but objects, gestures, and thoughts that are human”177.
What these lines powerfully convey is that any attempt to subjugate the alien and stamp
out the particular through conquest, although seemingly contributing to the
homogenising onslaught of globalisation, is actually a great disservice to humanity and a
moral conception of the “universal”. Fortunately, history has examples of societies
digging deep in their cultural values to deal with loss of the “tangible”. Where trauma
really runs deep and inflicts the most damage is when “the legitimacy of the outcome
(whether of war or ideational and epistemic dominance) outlives the end of the contest
because […] the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time the force and status of
material “fact” by the sheer material weight of the magnitudes of damaged and opened
human bodies”178.
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Much of the existing literature studies the toll taken by war in the form of trauma caused
to heritage. Little thought has been invested in considering the trauma inflicted on
societies who witness their heritage being destroyed or taken away. Beth Stamm et al
attempt to address this question through a Cultural Clash Theory which “posits that
original cultures have identifiable and sustainable economic, social, political, and spiritual
systems in the pre-contact era” and these are vulnerable to dissolution when challenged
by another culture. In response, claim these authors, the “injured culture lays claim to
economic and social resources, preferably with the support and encouragement of the
hegemonic culture”179. This formulation helps us understand why demands for
repatriation and restitution are such an important piece of the puzzle of reclaiming
cultural agency. Usefully for international law, it also acknowledges the crucial role that
powerful actors who benefit from such a system of dispossession need to play in
rebalancing it. Therefore, for the human security paradigm to form a useful bridge
between International Relations and International Law, the goal of achieving Freedom
from Trauma should be recognised an integral part a long term intergenerational
understanding of “Security”.
Envisioning long-term security in this broader sense, swings the pendulum back towards
a thicker conception of human security but, I would argue, without necessarily diluting its
actionability and operative impact. It also embodies the spirit of the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 66/290 mentioned above. Firstly, it is a conceptualisation
that not only protects cultural heritage but recognises the potential of and invests in
empowering host communities to do so in their own way. Secondly, it treats cultural
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trauma as that “early warning mechanism”, paying heed to which “help to mitigate the
impact of current threats and, where possible, prevent the occurrence of future threats”,
as stated in the resolution. But this does not mean that this expanded idea holds no
promise for the near term, for, as we have noted above, future prospects are an
important determinant of security in the present.
However, such redefinition of human security also requires us to contend with the norm
of military necessity. The balance between risking the lives of combatants and the
obligation to protect heritage and cultural property is a difficult one to strike. Describing
attaining military objectives whilst preserving cultural property as goals mutually in
conflict, Forrest argues that “the key to resolving this conflict may be found in the
humanitarian legal doctrine of military necessity”180. He goes on to state that “necessity
has been viewed as a limitation to unbridled barbarity” and finds expression in the
principle of proportionality. It is important to consider the range of threats faced by
heritage in the course of warfare and military occupation.
Since antiquity, heritage has been targeted to signify an attack on the most obvious
symbols of a ruling power or community. Often the intent behind destruction of heritage
sites has also been to erase local identity. In recent decades, much publicised attacks on
heritage sites have been seen as an instrument of propaganda and terror.
The first question relevant to this discussion would be asking why heritage is vulnerable
to destruction during wars.
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Gegner and Ziino frame the issue thus181:
“If heritage can be understood as the selective use of the past as cultural and political
resources in the present, then there are few fields more productive for understanding
the process than the heritage of war.”
This conclusion is based on their perception of heritage as “constituted in the act of
identifying what is appropriate to remember and preserve in light of experience”.
Zainab Bahrani claims that “cultural destruction in war is not always a result of accidental
or “collateral” damage”. Instead, she characterizes the plundering of museums and
libraries in Iraq as “destruction of history in a country under occupation”182. Bahrani
underscores the rhetorical strategies that emphasize rescue and reconstruction and
minimize annihilation, further making heritage “a pawn in this game of war”. She reviews
a host of well-funded programs aimed at whitewashing the image of what she terms the
occupation of Iraq, concluding that activities aimed at heritage restoration fall within this
category and continue to be designed to benefit interested constituencies in the West.
According to Bahrani:
The loss or destruction of historical monuments can and does have a devastating effect on
people. That is why throughout history such destruction has been calculated into the
strategies of war. This is the reason why iconoclasm and destruction or the relocation of
monuments have occurred as a deliberate act of war throughout recorded world history,
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and why ethnic cleansing works through the annihilation of people by means of eradicating
any trace of their past.
Echoing this hypothesis, David Roberts explains destruction of ancient Iraqi and Syrian
sites by ISIS thus:
Destroying such heritage is thus a part of their duty, as they see it, to reject such a
"nationalist agenda" that the statues, temples, and indeed, cities represent183.
Hardy argues that throughout history, “‘punitive expeditions’ to vulnerable States by
powerful States persisted as standard practices” and that plunder of cultural artefacts
during these expeditions was motivated sometimes by strategic and at other times by
material considerations. Practices of preservation, destruction and reservation also
varied through time and space. “Preservation and destruction were matters of religious
duty (or its absence) and economic benefit, rather than matters of historical
understanding and cultural respect. Restitution was still ultimately performed as an act
of realpolitik and strategy, rather than a recognition of property rights or cultural
belonging”184, says Hardy.
A further distinction to be drawn here is that of destruction during combat and
destruction inflicted after a territory has fallen into the hands of enemy combatants.
Nabil al-Tikriti alleges wilful neglect on part of US military and government officials when
it came to protecting cultural heritage in occupied Iraq, something he terms “not a policy
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failure but a policy of failure”. He deems it “reasonable to suggest that a lack of cultural
sympathy was at play”.
William Schabas notes that this distinction is in fact mirrored in some of the relevant
international legal instruments. Referring to the Rome Conference (1998) Schabas
recalls:
The travaux preparatoires indicate that the drafters were familiar with two models or types
of provision governing cultural property, one applicable to the conduct of hostilities and the
other to persons and property that have fallen under the control of one of the parties185.
In his analysis, it is crucial to draw this distinction when unpacking the terminology of
“attacks” on cultural property, particularly in the context of international criminal law.
The above overview of the various threats to heritage in the throes of conflict
demonstrates that the doctrine of military necessity is complex and can seem
insurmountable especially when the endangerment of human life is factored in. Military
necessity is on its own a complex construct due to different capabilities of the parties to
a conflict, the ever-evolving technologies of warfare and the difficulty of achieving
normative consensus across the board around such an idea. The proscriptions of military
necessity in practice must be weighed against considerations of strategic and tactical
advantage in the battlefield. To determine where the line between preventing human
suffering in the immediacy of conflict and protecting cultural heritage for the long run
falls, is beyond the scope of this study. It is at this juncture however, that Chinkin and
Kaldor’s observation that in the process of alleviating human suffering, international law
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has legitimised war, is resonant. In the next chapter we deploy the conceptual
possibilities of Constructivism to investigate this point further and understand how, both
in conditions of war and peace, when it comes to International Law too, the adage
“Words make Worlds” holds true.
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Chapter 5
Protecting Cultural Heritage: Constructivism
Chapter Highlights


Constructivism is a useful framework for engaging with concepts such as rules,
norms and institutions and their relationship with each other



Constructivist analysis allows us to step back from certain constructs and
formulations to examine the way in which they are constituted



The attention that constructivists pay to the use of language enables us to unpack
the normative positions embodied by international law on the protection of
cultural heritage



This paradigm is also used to turn a critical gaze on international law from the
outside in by evaluating it as a product of hegemonic discourse and practices of
knowledge creation that lead to it
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Countering the methodological individualism of rational choice approaches,
Constructivists argue that individuals cannot be understood stripped from their social
context. In practice their approach generates the hypothesis that if institutions embody
the rules of the game, then they can be powerful determinants of identities and
preferences and influence behaviour. As a framework of searching for meaning,
constructivism is consistent with the view that theory is “indispensable, at times, to
make progress, but alone, it is false”186.
Constructivist theory assumes that learning is a process in which people construct new
ideas or concepts based upon their knowledge. Each and every person selects and
processes information, constructs hypotheses and makes decisions, relying on a
particular structure. This cognitive structure (also called schema or mental model)
provides meaning and organization to experiences and allows the individual to go
beyond the information given. Richard Price credits constructivism with “demonstrating
that moral norms can matter in world politics” before taking on the challenge of
answering “how and why some norms mattered in some places or sometimes, but not in
others”187. For Price, the emerging concern for the constructivist research agenda is to
provide robust ethical defences of all norms advocated or interventions prescribed.
Addressing the criticism that constructivists draw from both, the sceptical and utopian,
ends of the theoretical spectrum, Price says188:
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Implicitly or explicitly endorsing developments such as the generation of an international
norm prohibiting the use of antipersonnel landmines or the creation of an ICC need not
preclude what some might champion as more fundamental progressive changes such as the
ending of war altogether. Indeed, until such larger international structures are in fact
favourably altered, constructivists can point the way to forms of action that could claim to
make a progressive difference, as opposed to falling short of much more ambitious
comparisons to the ideal that, until their realization, do amount to failure.
Nicolas Onuf’s point of departure is the idea of agency which he believes to be a product
of social conditioning189. In his analysis, agents are those individuals or groups who play
an active part in society based on certain rules. The way rules are either obeyed or
flouted constitutes social practice and a stable pattern of such practices is what Onuf
designates as an “institution”. Because agents derive their ability to act under “rules”,
having rules creates a condition of being “ruled”, in this framework. Those actions of
agents are considered “rational” which are directed at achieving a set of socially
determined goals. Thus unlike in the realist conception, constructivist rationality is not
set in stone but is context dependent and the variables influencing it may be
exogenously determined rather than simply a function of the internal structure of the
international system. To sum up, constructivist agency is institutionally constituted but
has an element of choice built into it. Exercise of this choice is what brings about
institutional evolution. Charlotte Epstein expands our understanding of Onuf by
suggesting that agents derive the range of possibilities within which they may act from
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the inherent structures of language190. Epstein adds that the influence of constructivism
has polarised International Relations between the causality and rationality of Realism at
one end and the constitutivity and reflexivity of constructivism on the other. As we have
seen so far, realists attribute compliance with international law to perception of interests
and reputational concerns while liberals are more concerned with legitimacy of the
process by which it comes into being. Constructivists believe “that international law is
most effective when it ceases to be part of the calculation at all, when the rules of
international law become so deeply internalized that they are followed simply as a
matter of course, as little reflected-upon state self-interest.191”
Persuasion, Issue-framing and Socialization
According to Payne, “Constructivists commonly explain persuasion by pointing to the
substantive content, or intrinsic characteristic, of particular ideas or claims”192. It has
further been argued by constructivists that messages tend to be more persuasive when
linked with already well-established norms, making this a key strategy for norm
entrepreneurs when they frame an issue. Payne explains that “frames” perform the dual
function of offering “a singular interpretation of a particular situation” and prescribing
“appropriate behavior for that context”193. Thus the constructivist position on issue
framing and persuasion may be summed up as follows: Frames draw on building blocks
from existing normative orders, broadly perceived as legitimate. They then structure
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messages with specific audiences in mind, outlining the nature of the issue and
advocating change.
Finnemore and Sikkink offer the following characterization of Norms194:


Norms and rationality are intimately connected (although for the most part the
one is discussed in scholarship at the exclusion of the other)



It is the prescriptive quality of “oughtness” that sets norms apart from other
kinds of rules



There are no bad norms from the perspective of those who promote the norm



A norm is an appropriate standard of behavior with reference to a given identity
and hence norms need not always be global



Adherence to norms has been linked to the “logic of appropriateness” but what
causes standards of appropriateness to evolve, be recognized and change over
time still needs explaining



International norms often begin as domestic norms and the domestic influence is
particularly strong early in the norm’s life cycle



For a certain norm to gain international acceptance, key states (and this will vary
as per issue area) adopt and implement them

The last two points of this characterization of norms described what is termed
“socialization”. Finnemore acknowledges the emphasis of constructivists on soft law in
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adding, “much of the macrotheoretical equipment of constructivism is better at
explaining stability than change”195. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope have observed
in a similar vein that the “fascination with norm creation, evolution, and destruction”
drives the conversation between Constructivists in International Relations and
International Legal theorists, in particular legal pluralists196. The constructivist support for
international law rests heavily on the legitimacy of the legal rule as well as the legitimacy
of the process through which it came into being. As Beth Simmons puts it, contrary to
realists and rational functionalists, constructivists argue that “international institutions
and organizations legitimate particular rules, enhancing their effectiveness through a
heightened sense of obligation rather than through their mere instrumental value as a
convenient point of convergence”197.
Constructivist Approach to Cultural Heritage Protection
Laura Demeter explains that identification of certain sites and objects as heritage is itself
a process of defining criteria and ascribing meaning. Specifically, she notes that “when a
consensus is achieved around certain ‘relevant’ values, categories and meanings, the
institutionalisation and classification as heritage takes place”198.
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An important definitional question relevant to the constructivist paradigm is that over
the distinction between the nomenclatures “cultural property” and “cultural heritage”.
Xanthaki sums up the adoption of both terms in international legal instruments thus:
The (1954) UNESCO Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed
Conflict defines cultural property as: ‘irrespective of origin or ownership…movable or
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’. The
restrictiveness of this definition is maintained in the (1999) Second Protocol to the
Convention, even though the Preamble emphasizes that rules in this area should reflect
developments in international law. The (1970) UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property is more detailed: cultural property is defined as ‘property which, on religious or
secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance to
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science’. The Convention also includes a
very detailed account of objects of cultural property. The (1972) UNESCO Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is an exception to
these early instruments, as it refers to cultural heritage, instead of cultural property199.
As concerns with protecting natural and intangible cultural heritage became more widely
recognised towards the latter half of the twentieth century, we find international
conventions (eg. UNESCO 1972 and UNIDROIT 1995) increasingly replace the term
cultural property with the term cultural heritage, which is broader in scope.
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According to Elizabeth Crooke, “the ideas of community and heritage share vital
characteristics: both have multiple definitions; are constructed for contemporary needs;
and will selectively draw on narratives of place, history and belonging”200. The second
most important point to consider within a constructivist paradigm on Heritage is
whether cultural property draws its meaning from and therefore belongs to a particular
culture or, as is the dominant perception, to humanity as a whole. To set the context for
this discussion, Benjamin Porter offers a useful explanation about the relationship
between heritage and identity201:
Heritage is an intentional phenomenon, a sense of the self in the past where the subjective
component of ‘self’ is ascribed at increasingly broad scales of the individual, community,
nation, and globe, and the temporal links between the subject and the past are based on
perceived genealogical, biological, or community connections. But heritage also possesses
an extensional component, where these subjective meanings are externalized in language,
practice, and objects that are concrete and publicly accessible.
In other words, the intrinsic abstract value of heritage as a link between the past, present
and future is just as important as the tangible, material worth of its embodied or
performative manifestation.
Discussing the evolution of international law on protection of cultural property
Merryman writes:
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The Lieber Code and its progeny all dealt comprehensively with the obligations of
belligerents; the protection of cultural property was merely one among many topics. In the
1930s, however, international interest turned to the preparation of a convention dealing
solely with the protection of cultural property in time of war. In 1935 the 21 American
nations promulgated a Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and
Monuments, now generally referred to as the Roerich Pact202.
To this, Merryman further says, the Nuremberg Trials added the innovation of holding
individual officials responsible for unlawful destruction of cultural property in the name
of a belligerent nation. The Preamble to The Hague Convention of 1954 justifies the
protection of cultural property by conferring on it the attribute of belonging to the
common cultural heritage of mankind. According to Merryman, reference to common
cultural heritage of mankind, “which has been echoed in later international instruments,
is a charter for cultural internationalism, with profound implications for law and policy
concerning the international trade in and repatriation of cultural property”. He labels this
important and influential approach of thinking about cultural property as cultural
internationalism.
The constructivist lens also enables us to think of conservation with reference to multiple
approaches conditioned by a diversity of values, beliefs and historical experience. The
practice of heritage tourism has resulted from a normative paradigm which prioritises
economic resource generation to achieve the aims of conservation. It has proven a highly
influential approach to the extent of motivating greater engagement with instruments
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put in place by international conventions such as The World Heritage List discussed
below. Multiplicity of interests in heritage further complicate the pre-existing culturally
derived ideas about its significance and proper conservation. Irrespective of the contextspecific model of conservation, by and large, “we find ourselves on the verge of conflict
when the value groups place on heritage is inversely proportional to their role as
stewards”203. Constructivism addresses the identity driven norm preferences that shape
perceptions of interest. In doing so, this theoretical apparatus helps grasp the impact of
cosmopolitan identity on the global consumption of cultural goods and view the
application of the rational choice and human security lenses from the outside in.
As noted above, constructivists believe that agents take their cue about the range of
possible actions available to them from the structure of language. Based on this premise,
Constructivism also helps us delve into the role played by communities of experts in
building a world around words. According to Derek Fincham204:
The cultural heritage movement emerged in the twentieth century as groups used law,
policy, and advocacy to undo these contemporary and historical takings (of art from various
cultures). But the movement has too often been reactive.
Fincham describes placing the onus of proving ownership of a cultural object on the
country of origin, while the collectors, auction houses and museums claim good faith
acquisitions by maintaining a culture of secrecy around the history of objects. Comparing
cultural exploitation of less affluent communities with the imposition of environmental
costs on less affluent parts of the world, Fincham argues that global flows of art and
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heritage objects mean access and enjoyment at one end and “cultural pollution” at the
other. He further asserts that the ramifications of these flows throw up questions
relevant to intergenerational justice. To address these concerns Fincham proposes an
analysis of “current local, national, and international cultural heritage discourse”205, to
identify sources of injustice. All said and done, he concludes, “the (cultural heritage)
movement needs an animating philosophy beyond “this used to be here and looters and
smugglers skirted the law””. The constructivist framework usefully serves just such a
cause by focusing its analysis on the role of norms and rhetorical strategies over actor
behaviour.
The language of cultural property
The Hague Convention, 1954, defines cultural property as below:
Article 1. Definition of cultural property For the purposes of the present Convention, the
term ‘cultural property’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:(a) movable or
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological
sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are
of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of
artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientiﬁc collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property deﬁned
above;(b) buildings whose main and eﬀective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the
movable cultural property deﬁned in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries
and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed
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conﬂict, the movable cultural property deﬁned in sub-para-graph (a);(c) centers
containing a large amount of cultural property as deﬁned in sub-para-graphs (a) and (b),
to be known as ‘centers containing monuments’.
Jane Anderson and Haidy Geismar write that “the language of cultural property […]
emerged predominantly in the nineteenth century as a means to position the nationstate as the owner of particular kinds of artefacts and institutions. Breaking open a space
between traditional ideas of private property and of public property, this category of
national property produced a new understanding of the inalienable relationship between
the state and its possessions.206”
Their expression of the term cultural property in the following terms is conceptually
significant207:
A curious hybrid of culture (the evanescent and immaterial systems and structures of
knowledge that bind human beings together) and property (the ideologies, political
regulations, customs and popular consensus that establish entitlement and sovereignty,
and determine claims and power over a range of tangible and intangible resources), cultural
property is an evolving category used to describe ways of talking about collective
entitlement, shared inheritance, the material nature of identity, and in more recent years,
to debate the ethics of the commoditization of culture.
Further they add that “to understand that the phrase ‘ cultural property ’ does not simply
reference an international category and bureaucratic order, but is itself an active site of
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claim making that is about political recognition, cultural memory, and identity
formation.208”
Significantly, Anderson and Geismar note the relationship between cultural property and
national identity formation, arguing that “Cultural property became one way to articulate
a political theory of society that was constituted not simply by the recognition of
individual rights, but by the recognition of collective entitlements triangulated through
ethnicity, territory, and citizenship in the context of the modern nation-state.209” It is
thanks to this close relationship between heritage and national identity that cultural
property became a defining feature of the sovereignty-based international system.
Anderson and Geismar contend210:
Cultural property as a distinct category of objects with accompanying sets of obligations,
emerged as a way to theorize the ethics of relationship between polities, and an important
discourse of diplomacy and respect between nations. The triangulation of sovereignty,
national identity, and anthropological notions of culture (...), underpinned by entangled
articulations of race, ethnicity and territory, framed the emergence of the nation-state in
the nineteenth century and started to forge the very notion of the modern international
community.
Yet, at the same time they acknowledge the disservice done by the universalisation of
the European template of nation-state to imaginations of cultural heritage that do not
conform with this dominant paradigm211.
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In the next two sections, we examine two important expressions signifying international
cooperation towards heritage conservation – the World Heritage List and the Universal
Museum – using the constructivist paradigm.
World Heritage List: Dynamics, Meanings and Impact of Site Inscription
The idea of common heritage of mankind was originally intended to signify that
regardless of where important cultural and natural heritage was located, it was the
responsibility of all states to pool efforts for its conservation. Such collective
responsibility was vested in states by virtue of a posited unity of human values, at the
same time, international cooperation was meant to happen alongside the efforts of
states to protect their own heritage domestically. Accordingly, Article IV of the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
states212:
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification,
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the
cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its territory,
belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its own
resources and, where appropriate, with any international assistance and co-operation, in
particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it may be able to obtain.
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Thus, while article IV vests primary responsibility with the State where the site is located,
Article VII envisages international cooperation in these terms:
For the purpose of this Convention, international protection of the world cultural and
natural heritage shall be understood to mean the establishment of a system of international
co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties to the Convention in their
efforts to conserve and identify that heritage.
This initial message however has been interpreted selectively and reinterpreted over
time. The first reason behind this is the divergent opinions on what makes a certain
monument or tradition or natural site inherently valuable. The second important driver
has been the simultaneous operation of a range of culturally, historically and
economically conditioned responses to the need of conservation – throwing up
questions of ownership, location and the tussle between maintaining originality on the
one hand and continuity and keeping traditions alive inter-generationally on the other.
Thus, the concept of world heritage fits the characterisation of a “frame” as elaborated
by Payne. The inscription of a particular site as “World Heritage” bestows upon it a
singular interpretation and also signifies submission to a particular regime of
conservation. The efforts of state actors towards applying for inscription, indicate the
level of persuasiveness of the framing “World Heritage Site”213.
As on May 2020, the details of UNESCO’s World Heritage List are as follows:
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Total Properties Listed214: 1121
Transboundary: 39
In Danger: 53
Cultural: 869
Natural: 213
Mixed: 39
The World Heritage List has been criticised for more sites from of certain world regions
being listed than others, calling into question how well it represents the common
heritage of mankind. Applications for nominations of sites to the list have increasingly
been motivated by enhancing the site’s attractiveness as a tourism destination. Lasse
Steiner and Bruno S. Frey find that “Gini coefficient as a measure of the inequality in the
distribution of Sites across the world is increasing over time, depicting an increasing
concentration of Sites in a few countries”215, even after UNESCO attempted to address
this concern through the Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible
World Heritage List in 1994 . Steiner and Frey find that the Gini coefficient as a measure
of inequality in the distribution of sites across countries has “has risen almost
monotonously over time from 0.34 in 1979 to 0.55 in 2009”216. In their assessment, the
lack of accountability of the World Heritage Center to the UNESCO General Assembly,
combined with the assertion of national interest when states get an opportunity to serve
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on the World Heritage Committee217, results in dominant states (such as the UNSC P5)
being over-represented in the World Heritage List. The much higher number of cultural
than natural sites is also suggestive of a definitional bias in heritage that favours the
European view of the concept. Since the prerogative of nominating sites rests with
states, the World Heritage List ends up reflecting the unequal capacities of countries
across the world, stemming from diverse economic and political conditions, to succeed in
the process. The inscription process itself it “time-consuming, controversial, and
politically polarizing” due to “the linkage to specific ethnic groups and achievements,
disputed historical territories, current religious and national tensions, and individual
biases over cultural values and achievements”218.
Enrico Bertacchini and Donatella Saccone explain that “having national heritage sites
with World Heritage recognition does not guarantee greater protection of or additional
resources to the enlisted properties”219. This often reduces the utility of the list to
prestige value or snob appeal and the maintenance requirements may trigger an increase
in reliance on revenues from tourism, enhancing the vulnerability of fragile sites.
Moses Katerega systematically revisits the implications of recognition as a World
Heritage Site for the Kasubi Tombs in Uganda220. A combination of creative ingenuity,
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spiritual significance and technical excellence inspired the nomination of the Kasubi
Tombs to the World Heritage List in 2001. Katerega, however, sums up the impact of the
label of a UNESCO World Heritage Site as follows:


A diminution in the role of community practices of conservation



Confusion around the responsibilities of various stakeholders



An increase in the attraction of the site as a tourism destination

It was not until the catastrophic fire of 2010 which destroyed the main tomb building that
a coordinated effort ensued among local, national and international stakeholders. The
noteworthy attribute of the reconstruction process of the site was that international
technical assistance was extended to strengthen local efforts and amplify the living
cultural traditions capable of recreation of the structure.
Based on the above evaluation of the World Heritage List within the constructivist
theoretical framework, a complex picture of the interplay between interests and norms
emerges with regard to decision making of states. Persuasion of normative frames may
be higher for state-actors holding less power in the international system, while powerful
actors may refer to norms simply as a rhetorical device to bolster their independent
interests. Here, Onuf’s idea that the existence of rules creates the condition of being
ruled becomes evident. We see the conjoint operation of the constructivist paradigm
where norms influence perceived interests with the realist hunch that the distribution of
power in the system yields varying degrees of such influence.
As mentioned above, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage vests primary responsibility of protecting their own heritage on
126

state parties. Thus the normative frame of state being the most important actor in
International Relations and International law, is reinforced by the Convention. Arguing
that such an orientation has created an “administrative mind”, Michael F Brown
identifies the following gaps in which emerge when it is translated into practice221:
First, most are creations of the nation state, whose interests are likely to diverge from
those of subcultural communities struggling to maintain a degree of distinctiveness. Even
when the state is not aggressively trying to redefine local cultures and heritage sites to suit
a nationalist narrative, a predilection for centralised control is likely to put too much power
in the hands of credentialed experts far removed from the everyday interactions that keep
heritage alive.
The constructivist framework also draws attention to the role that communities of
experts play as norm entrepreneurs eventually influencing deliberations around framing
the law. Has greater interest from professional and academic communities changed the
heritage movement? There is mixed evidence on this question with some evidence
suggesting an increase in the role of experts and other evidence pointing to the
overshadowing of expert opinion by political calculus222.
The United States Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act was discussed in
the chapter on Game Theory.
SECTION 306 of the Act states223:
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[17] CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
…
(2) Appointments made under paragraph (1) shall be made in such a manner so as to
insure(A) fair representation of the various interests of the public sectors and the private
sectors in the international exchange of archaeological and ethnological materials, and
(B) that within such sectors, fair representation is accorded to the interests of regional
and local institutions and museums.
Thus we see that professional and special interest groups form the pillars of the decisionmaking process. This can have a negative impact if the idea of heritage is narrowly
construed around the goals and motivations of such groups. At the same time, it can
have (and some authors argue has had) a positive impact if groups such as
archaeologists educate society and policy-makers about the significance of conserving
heritage in its original context. According to Lynn Meskell “mounting challenges to
expert opinions and decision making, the increasing and overt politicization of the
(World Heritage) Committee, and UNESCO’s fiscal crisis224” are the key current
challenges standing in the way of achieving the goals of the 1972 Convention concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Meskell observes that over
time, the World Heritage Committee has come to be populated by diplomats and
politicians rather than experts and attributes the difficulties of overcoming these
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challenges as much to the power and influence wielded by State Parties, particularly
when they have representation on the Committee. She writes225:
This statist power structure is inescapable when attempts are made to instigate structural
changes, whether creating an indigenous expert advisory panel, recognizing nonstate actors
like nongovernmental organizations, or upholding the heritage rights of minorities within
nation states.
As expert bodies, the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration
of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the International Council on Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) posses
“serious decision-making heft”226. However, argues Meskell, in recent years at the level
of Committee deliberations, political representatives have managed to drown out the
voices of experts in favour of diplomatic bargaining and national priorities. Thus, we find
that whether they have been given prominence or not, experts in the various subfields
under the umbrella of heritage, have played a noteworthy role, exemplifying the
constructivist take on the power of ideas, concepts and terms.
Issue Framing and the Universal Museum
Museums and the rest of the art world in western countries have adopted various
linguistic devices to describe their attitude towards cultural objects from other parts of
the world and strengthen their ownership claims over these objects. In the colonial era,
the works plundered from colonised regions were described as “inferior”, “primitive”
and symbolising the barbarianism of the other when standing alongside the oeuvres of
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the civilising race. Describing the role played by museums such as the Louvre in French
nation-building, Flynn recalls: “Here the bourgeois citizen could partake of a narrative
vision of civilisation expressed through the carefully arranged collections and locate
himself and his country at the apex of that historical development”227. In the postcolonial era, the continued accumulation of cultural objects in metropolitan museums
was justified in terms of the educational role it supposedly played for the privileged
audience. In recent years, the terminology of “universal museum” has been crafted to
convey a sense of transcendence of space springing from a technologically derived
imagination of globalisation that has no place for the local228. With specific reference to
claims of repatriation made by countries in Africa, Tapuwa R. Mubaya and Munyaradzi
Mawere note that the verbiage Universal Museum has been “deployed chiefly as a
defence against repatriation claims”229. By way of critique of the construct “Universal
Museum”, these authors add230:
If museums were capable of helping to devise and communicate a universal perspective on
cultural values which achieves credibility and currency outside western cultural elites, they
would indeed make an invaluable contribution to global society. What makes people of
critical minds unconvinced by the idea of universal museums is that the idea is perceived as
evidence of cultural insensitivity or an instrument of injustice.
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Thus, we are made aware that language as rhetoric or instrumental ploy should be
distinguished from language that represents some form of consensus on underlying
normative content in the constructivist paradigm. According to Howlett-Martin the
concept of universal museum is the product of an orientalist paradigm “which viewed
indigenous people as incapable of understanding, protecting, and appreciating their past
and which laid the foundations for the universalist paradigm of a common heritage for
all”231.
In 2002 nineteen prominent museums based in North America and Europe issued The
Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums. The signatories were
directors of The Art Institute of Chicago; Bavarian State Museum, Munich (Alte
Pinakothek, Neue Pinakothek); State Museums, Berlin; Cleveland Museum of Art; J. Paul
Getty Museum, Los Angeles; Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York; Los Angeles
County Museum of Art, Louvre Museum, Paris; The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New
York, The Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; The Museum of Modern Art, New York; Opificio
delle Pietre Dure, Florence; Philadelphia Museum of Art; Prado Museum, Madrid;
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam; State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg; ThyssenBornemisza Museum, Madrid; Whitney Museum of American Art, New York; The British
Museum, London. The main message of the Declaration was that repatriation claims
against their collections were unjustified in light of “different sensitivities and values,
reflective of that earlier era”, when the contested objects were acquired. Such a claim is
at first glance incompatible with the 1995 UNIDROIT Conventions which affirms that “the

231

Howlett-Martin P. (2018), Art, Nationalism and Cultural Heritage: Artworks belong where they are found,
Amazon, p 41

131

adoption of the provisions of this Convention for the future in no way confers any
approval or legitimacy upon illegal transactions of whatever kind which may have taken
place before the entry into force of the Convention”232. By citing “different sensitivities”
the self-proclaimed universal museums do not engage with provision in UNIDROIT 1995
under Article 4(1) which assures “fair and reasonable compensation provided that the
possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the object was stolen
and can prove that it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object”, demonstrating
a lack of confidence in their own due diligence protocols and practices.
Tom Flynn writes that the Declaration was based on an “implicit assumption that an idea
born during the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment can be reconciled with
more recent scholarship in fields such as postmodernism, postcolonial theory, and the so-called new museology in order to function as a viable
philosophical framework for the world’s museums in the future”233. The debate
surrounding the Declaration on the Importance and Value of the Universal Museum is
instructive on how a clash of interests plays out as the battle for narrative control.
Indeed, as the Declaration itself proclaims: Museums are agents in the development of
culture, whose mission is to foster knowledge by a continuous process of reinterpretation.
Critics have pointed out that the 2002 Declaration on the Importance and Value of the
Universal museum is endorsed by signatory institutions based in the United States and
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Europe. This conflation of “global” or “universal” with western is not uncommon.
Katherine Burlingame is one of many commentators who have shown that the intended
purpose of the declaration was to shield the elite museums in the western world from
repatriation claims of source countries234. Burlingame demonstrates the vacuity of the
“universal” claim by citing examples of museums in Kenya which house large collections
documenting and furthering research on human origins and natural history.
Those who claim status as a universal museum often argue that the nation states who
claim contested cultural objects are not representative of the ancient cultures in which
the objects originated. This argument is an extrapolation of European historical
precedent where “universal survey museum that emerged during the eighteenth century
made use of traditional religious language and iconography to establish itself as an
instrument of the bourgeois nation state”235. Besides, even though the nation state
appropriates heritage discourse to legitimise itself, we must recognise that the nation
state is itself not a universally organic concept and is not uniformly experienced and
related to across the world236.

234

Burlingame K. (2014), Universal Museum: Cultural and Ethical Implications, in Viliekis O. (ed) The Right to
[World] Heritage: Conference Proceedings, BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg pp 384-398
235
Flynn p 12
236
Rana P.B. Singh’s description of the term Sacredscape in the context of India offers an imagination of
heritage that is located within but not tied to the nation-state. He writes: “The concept of the holy place in
Indian culture (tirtha) is described as a consecration of the cosmic influence in topography wherein culture,
geography and spirituality interact with each other in the formation of meaning, symbolism and
transcendental power within a territory. The sacred power and the sacred design are experienced through
pilgrimage and the totality of the territorial perspective of sacrality and holy landscape is called ‘sacredscape’
(tirtha kshetra). Pilgrimage is thus an expression of the human quest for a divine connection between man and
environment, to experience the spirit of sacredscape. As most sacredscapes became embodied in the built
structures focused upon sites of pilgrimages, sacredscapes became part of a newly developing type of
pilgrimage tourism. Here heritage is being used in a broad sense involving both natural and cultural milieux,
including ideas, beliefs, and ways of life, and above all the intimate link between human psyche and mystical
nature. In this way it may be argued that heritage is better understood for its ‘psychological resonance’ than
its precise meaning.”
Singh, Rana P.B. 1997. Urban heritage in India; in, Contested Urban Heritage, eds. Shaw & Jones: 101-131

133

The usage “common heritage of mankind” has been criticized for discounting alternative
associations with heritage and history and approaches to conservation that do not fit the
hegemonic western mould237. According to Sandra Bowdler, “defining something as
belonging to that transcendent category is a means of excluding anyone who might have
a particular interest in it”238. She elaborates by recalling the practices of repainting of
ancestral sites in certain aboriginal communities of Western Australia, specifically citing
one such project which became controversial and was eventually abandoned after being
charged with “desecration” in a complaint filed by a member of the white majority. Thus
we see that the universalizing paradigms of World Heritage List, common heritage of
mankind and universal museum lead to disregard and dispossession of the views and
practices of marginalised communities and regions vis-à-vis cultural life.
Using the tools of constructivism, we are able to delineate the influence of a dominant
worldview on the very conception of heritage and approaches to conservation, including
in law. The widespread usage of linguistic devices like “cultural property”, “world
heritage” and “universal museum” reflect an authoritative and disciplinary framework,
grounded in cultural institutions such as museums, in material culture that is
monumental, sacred, and antique, and in languages of law, policy, and governance”
(Anderson and Geismar 2017). Thus constructivism alerts us both to the language of law
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and the legal language as the constitutive framework for international action in a
particular domain.
Autre Temps, Autre Moeurs?
Studying international cooperation from a constructivist lens helps us specify the
relationship between social norms and existing legal instruments. As Derek Fincham has
stated, “In some cases, norms conflict with the legal regime; in other cases these norms
change the law itself”239. To put this in constructivist terms, the international law on
protection of cultural heritage does not entirely embody the rules of the game, yet, it has
shown the ability to reflect gradual change in norms. Constructivism also allows us to
interpret institutional evolution in terms of choice rather than as derived based on
structurally-determined givens. The analysis of “World Heritage List” and “Universal
Museum” in this chapter provides a nuanced take on exercise of choice and its
implications.
The constructs of “world heritage” and “universal museum” seek to recontextualise
cultural objects. These constructs have currency based upon the assumption that to
localise or nationalise heritage is to politicise it whereas to globalise or universalise it is
an exercise in depoliticisation. However, the model of globalisation which is espoused by
proponents of universal museum is acquisitive. It maintains hubs of accumulated wealth
amidst generalised deprivation. It does not question the structures which perpetuate
inequality but castigates the ability of those who bear the cost of globalisation for their
assumed inability to protect their own resources, culture and traditions. But perhaps
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most subversively, it dresses its historical specificities into an alluring garb of universality
which transcends both space and time. As a significant body of scholarship has
established, the universal museum was and continues to be a figment of empire’s
mission civilisatrice.
Does constructivism further non-western IR in this case?
Maybe maybe not. But the study of heritage as a question within the ambit of
international relations does. Heritage is firstly, not of concern only to hegemonic powers
or great powers. Studying international cooperation to protect cultural heritage does not
privilege the study of high politics which has conventionally been the case with both
international relations and international law, while still allowing us to have discussions
about the causes and impact of war and conflict and the structures of global
interdependence and inequality. Depending on how we find a way for different ideas
about heritage and its conservation to coexist side by side, we may be able to conceive
an approach to studying the international that is neither universalising nor ethnocentric.
Shiv Visvanathan offers an alternative perspective on all of the aspects of understanding
and managing heritage discussed below. Instead of viewing them as the answer, he
argues that heritage “needs to be rescued: first, from the jingoism of the nation state
which conscripts it for identity formation; second, from a bureaucracy that forges it into
a technical entity closer to the sense of property; and third, from a casual populism that
sees it as part of a tourist fixation”240. Visvanathan’s call for “a language which is less
economic, less expert oriented, combining the physical and metaphysical so that it
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retains its civilizational and vernacular quality”, is a nod to the constructivist emphasis on
the primacy of language. Visvanathan speaks not of caring for heritage but of heritage as
a form of caring and thereby advocates for trusteeship as the solution. He offers a radical
critique of universalism – as a figment and aspiration of western political thought – by
reminding us that “both difference and diversity have acquired an innate secondariness,
being more part of the problem rather than the problematic of political thought”. Thus, a
close reading of Visvanathan allows us to see how any claim to “universal”, is not only an
ironic way of approaching heritage protection, but in fact antithetical to the very idea of
heritage. Yet, in critiquing universalism, Visvanathan is wary of reactive provincialism.
Therefore, he calls for an understanding of Diversity where “more sensitive to limits and
yet provides a different commons of creativity, where the mystery of the whole
celebrates the magic of the parts, where the whole is never totally knowable, where the
parts can trigger new cosmologies and worldviews” based on a vision of Democracy
characterised by “a new dialectic between the universalizing and pluralizing”, where,
“parts acquire a new legitimacy as they are not provincialized, hegemonized, localized,
but are embedded in a new cosmopolitan intimacy of part and whole”.
Visvanathan’s expiration into our relationship with heritage offers a fresh take on the
foundational building blocks of Western political theory, viewed from a non-western
lens. As previously discussed, political science and Eurocentric epistemology wield a
great influence over International Relations. A discussion about heritage makes it
possible to revisit the fundamental ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity and diversity,
thereby pointing the way to new possibilities for International Relations and its dialogue
with International Law.
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Chapter 6
Protecting Cultural Heritage: Responses in International Law
Chapter Highlights


Approaches to protection of cultural heritage discernible in existing international
law are discussed under the rubrics of Legalisation, Criminalisation and Regulation



The findings that emerge are superimposed over the analysis presented in the last
three chapters which focus on dominant paradigms in International Relations



United Nations General Assembly resolutions are reviewed chronologically to
establish the norm emergence and evolution of an opinio juris supporting
restitution and repatriation of cultural patrimony in cases of illegal acquisition and
export



Just war theory is revisited in the context of an intercivilisational dialogue with
particular reference to intentional and collateral destruction of heritage in conflict
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The uniformity and aspiration to objectivity of law starkly contrasts the diversity and
subjectivity inherent to the basic concept of heritage. According to Michael F Brown, law
encodes meanings to influence social practice driven by a quest for uniformity241. The
pursuit of uniform approaches to protect heritage globally, through international law,
strikes Brown as ironic.
In this chapter, the international law on protection of cultural heritage is reviewed under
three clusters of responses: Legalisation, Criminalisation, and Regulation and Restitution.
Our thinking about Just War – jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum – has significant
implications for how we perceive and deal with threats posed to cultural heritage, both
tangible and intangible, in the context of war. The concern with principles of just war is
also where international humanitarian law and international criminal law trace their
foundations back to. Later in this chapter, this study’s emphasis on “other ways of
knowing” is applied to Just War thinking. Based on the findings of this exercise, certain
conclusions relevant to protecting heritage in the context of war are arrived at.
Legalisation
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Referring to law as both contract and covenant242, Abbott and Snidal write that in the
international realm, “Legalization has effect through normative standards and processes
as well as self-interested calculation, and both interests and values are constraints on the
success of law”243. From the standpoint of International Relations scholars, both hard
and soft law are, therefore, equally important. In this section however, the international
lawyer’s understanding of legalisation as creation of binding obligations through treaty
law is our point of departure. In addition to obligation, precision and delegation are
important attributes of this view of legalisation.
Alessandro Chechi describes the emergence of international cultural heritage law as a
sub-field in international law in these terms244:
At the national level, most States have enacted legislation that recognises the specificity of
cultural objects and subjects such assets to a legal regime that is more protective and less
trade-oriented than the regime normally applied to ordinary goods. At the international
level, international organisations progressively adopted rules and principles due to the
perception that the body of domestic law in force was not sufficient to cope with the
different challenges posed in this specific field.
Retracing the chronological evolution of the idea of protecting cultural property in
international law, Kate Fitz Gibbon finds that the Lieber Code of 1863 was influenced by
the “notion that it is wrong to impose unnecessary suffering on the losers in a
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conflict”245. The Roerich Pact of 1935 designated monuments, museums and institutions
dedicated to art and culture as neutral institutions. The Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954, vested the
ownership of cultural heritage in all of humanity. The 1954 Hague Convention defines
cultural property thus:
Article 1. Definition of cultural property For the purposes of the present Convention, the
term ‘ cultural property ’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership: (a) movable or
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological
sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of
art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest;
as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of
reproductions of the property defined above; buildings whose main and effective
purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to
shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in subparagraph (a); centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘ centers containing monuments ’ .
UNESCO’s Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970, addressed the concerns
with looting and trafficking of cultural goods. The UNESCO Convention Concerning the
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Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, expanded the definition of
heritage which had hitherto been limited to art and antiquities and lays down criteria on
the basis of which cultural and natural sites may be included in the World Heritage List.
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects signalled
an intent to strengthen measures designed to ensure restitution of cultural objects to
countries of origin. The UNIDROIT Convention has the following characteristics:


It allows states and individuals (thereby conferring private litigation rights
without state intervention) to claim restitution and bring a cause of action in the
country where the disputed object is located, with no retroactive effect



Theft is sufficient grounds for claiming restitution but illegal export is not



Compensation for bona fide purchasers of stolen objects is provided for, in an
attempt to balance competing interests



UNIDROIT 1995 was an initiative of UNESCO to address the private international
legal aspects of UNESCO 1970 and hence the two instruments are deemed
compatible

Thus, we see an evolution in the guiding principles behind the international legal
instruments over time. The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible
Cultural Heritage, 2003, extended the scope of protections to include living traditions.
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, 2005, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 2007, also address intangible cultural heritage.
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The discernible divergence in the nationalist or internationalist bent of international legal
instruments is captured by Gregory Scott in these words246:
In comparing the available international agreements, there is no single directive as to
whom, precisely, errant property is to be repatriated, and the relevant documents can in
general be grossly divided into two groups that represent varying perspectives. The first,
including the UNESCO Convention on Illicit Art and International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") present a bias favoring a conclusion that cultural property is
part of, and necessarily attached to, a particular location or group. To the contrary, the
second group represented by The Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and certain of Japan's recent
enactments take a significantly different and more general view that culture and its
proprietary by-products are to be considered the common heritage of mankind.
However, from a practical standpoint, Scott acknowledges that “due to the complexity
of the considerations and the relative dearth of available and effective principles for
settling these kinds of disputes, it is not unusual in this context for claims of current
entitlement to be founded upon situational moral or serendipitous contemporary social
or political biases rather than upon substantive legal principles”247. In preceding
chapters, we have discovered theoretical frameworks in International Relations help us
investigate the influence of moral positions and political circumstances on the
conception, evolution, interpretation and implementation of legal principles. In
forthcoming sections of this chapter, I centre approaches in international law which
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constitute models of cooperation for heritage protection. One could imagine
Criminalisation and Regulation/repatriation as two kinds of responses under the broad
umbrella of legalisation. Whereas criminalisation pulls international law in a more
positivist direction of hard law, regulation and restitution allow us to explore the
normative force of international law. Through this analytical exercise, we find support for
Abbott and Snidal’s contention that “the choice between hard and soft law is not a
binary one”248.
Criminalisation
David Keane and Valencia Azarova suggest that “The definition and institutionalization of
the consequence of criminal prosecution for offences against cultural property is rooted
in the international legal order. While the 1954 Hague Convention provides for individual
criminal responsibility in case of certain breaches, the effectiveness of the provision was
undermined by the lack of a list of specific offenses that could give rise to criminal
sanctions, later enunciated in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol as part of five
“serious violations:” the first three corresponding to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977, the fourth and fifth considered serious
violations of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Protocol.249” Accordingly,
the five offences are as follows:
(1) Making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack250;
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(2) using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in
support of military action;” (3) “extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural
property protected under the Convention and [Protocol II] (4) “making cultural property
protected under the Convention . . . the object of attack;” (5) “theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, or acts of violence directed against, cultural property protected
under the Convention.” (1999 Second Protocol)
Criminalisation, as a response, affords us a glimpse into judicial decision-making on issues
of heritage protection. Stephen Hall situates judicial decision-making as a source of
making of rules and their identification in International law. He writes251:
Although there is no doctrine of stare decisis in international law, decisions of international
and domestic courts and tribunals are often highly persuasive evidence for determining the
content and scope of international norms derived from custom, treaties and the general
principles.
Punishing art theft and trafficking in cultural property as a criminal offence has the
advantage of being a deterrent, especially when the penalty imposed is imprisonment.
This is so because dealers and collectors are generally wealthy individuals who will not be
deterred by fines252. However, this response also has its share of difficulties. Leila
Amineddoleh observes that “Scienter is frequently a stumbling block for prosecutors in
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any theft matter, but it is exponentially more difficult in cases of art theft”253. The
provenience and provenance of looted antiquities being either unknown or forged in
most cases, makes it challenging to establish that the accused knew that they were
purchasing a stolen object. Museums are further seen to be immune from fear of
prosecution as “board members themselves are the people responsible for overseeing
the inner workings of the institutions” and protection of cultural property being in most
cases a low priority for government agencies, “public intervention is too sporadic”254.
Simon Mackenzie has observed that responses in international law to illicit deals in
cultural goods have taken the form of criminalising such acts. He cites the inclusion of
trafficking in cultural property within the scope of the United Nations Convention on
Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as a further development in the same direction.
However, Mackenzie is concerned with the inherent tendency in criminology to gaze
downward or focus on the lower echelons of society. Instead, he finds the role of dealers
and collectors in the cultural property trade to more closely resemble “white-collar crime
by individuals and groups, corporate crime, and state and state-corporate crime255” and
therefore urges an upward gaze or their recognition as crimes of the powerful.
Mackenzie further argues that since dealers are the relatively powerful actors in the
system, the trade “may be more usefully controlled by a regulatory approach to the
trade as opposed to a narrowly legalistic one”.
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According to William Pearlstein, the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
passed by the US Congress in 1983 sought to allow enforcement of import restrictions in
the US to curb illicit trade while still encouraging a thriving cross-border exchange of
cultural objects. The underlying logic was that “the carrot of US import restrictions
would be used as a stick to negotiate agreements for partage, museum loans, excavation
permits for US archaeologists, cooperation and exchange among curators and art
historians, and even export permits for redundant, non-critical objects”256. At the
domestic level, particularly in the United States, criminalisation has been viewed by some
as having favoured “the extraterritorial enforcement of sweeping national-patrimony
laws”257, in the process supressing the legal art market and hurting the interests of the
art community and cultural education of the public. Pearlstein, for instance, contrasts the
regulatory approach inherent to the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act with the approach of criminalisation favoured by US courts under the national Stolen
Property Act, describing this as an example of “judicial nullification of congressional
intent”. He further adds that the stance of US courts in the McClain cases was criticised
for being influenced by principles of international law rather than strictly upholding US
common law. Others, operating with the lens of private international law list examples
where national-patrimony laws have not been upheld in the courts of market countries258
and focus attention on the illicit trade in antiquities as the more pressing concern.
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Surveying on-going efforts to address the damage sustained to cultural heritage in Syria,
Brian Daniels and Salam al Kuntar address the possibility of international criminal
prosecution of heritage related offences in future. Based on existing case law they find
that “prosecutors will select to pursue indictments in which a party is unambiguously at
fault and there is no significant armed opposition”259, so as to comply with the military
necessity exception. The complex circumstances under which destruction of heritage in
Syria has taken place heightens the difficulty of satisfying this condition.
The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) successful prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi
a.k.a Abou Tourab in 2016 for destruction of UNESCO protected and World Heritage sites
in Mali during the occupation of Timbuktu by the Ansar Eddine armed group, is an
instructive case for criminalisation as a response260. The outcome of the case has been
lauded for exemplifying speedy prosecution by the ICC with cooperation from the African
states of Mali and Niger. The criticisms levelled against the ICC for this case, however,
expose the limits of criminalisation as an effective measure for protection of heritage on
conflict. Under the Rome statute, “gravity” of the crime is one of two core principles of
the ICC, the other being complementarity. Critics of the ICC’s decision to prosecute AlMahdi have pointed out other instances where the Office of the Prosecutor has failed or
declined to intervene, arguing that these incidents meet the “gravity” requirement far
more than the destruction of heritage sites. Reservations have also been expressed on
whether “Al Mahdi is indeed the most responsible for the crimes”261. As seen in the case
of Syria, several militia groups, a cross section of the population involved in excavation
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and the global supply chain of illicit antiquities are all implicated in the destruction of
cultural property. In such a situation, there are no straightforward answers to the
question: who is most responsible? Another source of debate is interpretation of the
word “attack” on cultural property. Two positions are discernible on this point. The first
construes attack in a limited sense as undertaken during hostilities through use of
military equipment. The other – which is the position taken by the ICC’s trial chamber in
the Al Mahdi case – is that “the element of direct[ing] an attack encompasses any acts of
violence against protected objects and will not make a distinction as to whether it was
carried out in the conduct of hostilities or after the object had fallen under the control of
an armed group”262. Based on this distinction, William Schabas has concluded that “Al
Mahdi has been convicted of a crime he did not commit”263.
Regulation, Repatriation and Restitution
The term restitution is used when illegally acquired cultural objects are returned to their
original makers/owners or their descendants whereas repatriation refers to return of
objects whose status has changed due to change in political conditions resulting from
state building or break-up. When demands for restitution are made for objects lost by
whatever means during colonial rule, the term “return” of cultural property has been
generally used. According to Mackenzie, regulation is an intentional goal-oriented
intervention and includes gathering of information, setting of standards and exerting
normative influence to produce behaviour modification. He compares a trader in the
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financial sector with a dealer in the art market and describes the similarities that emerge
as follows:
Looking out for oneself is the primary rule in such market settings, the overall market being
something that dealers see themselves as exploiting rather than identifying with as their
responsibility. The market is on this view a context for their actions rather than constituted
by them, and the temptation to take a profitable risk-shifting approach rather than a costly
and time-consuming risk-managing one is great.
Mackenzie concludes that this outlook is the basis not only for risk-taking behaviour but
also triggers a passing the parcel game of dumping the risk onto other stakeholders
(reminiscent of the impact of credit default swaps on pension funds). Therefore, the
intended purpose of regulation in this view is to counter risk-taking and risk-shifting
attitudes and contain the practices stemming from them. “How might we think about
‘crystallising’ the risk considerations in any given transaction, or making them more real
in the minds of the dealers, so as to prompt more of a risk-management approach?”, asks
Mackenzie. On the flipside, Mackenzie also recognises the limits to drawing parallels with
the financial sector. Specifically, the ordinary citizen who may be a victim of wrongdoing
is significantly more likely to report in case of the financial sector compared to the
cultural goods sector. On the one hand, this poses a serious challenge for the regulatory
approach to contend with, while on the other, it reinforces the need for international law
(and legal rhetoric) to inform national and local responses.
Critics of repatriation and restitution, often portray these claims as stemming from
extreme nationalist and anti-market parochialism – a characterisation that Tom Flynn
terms “McCarthyite condemnation”. Instead, explains Flynn, “rather than pursuing
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narrow political aims, what many are arguing for is a loosening of the Western museum’s
proprietorial grasp on the world’s material culture and the narratives that circulate
around it. Instead they argue for the construction of a more internationalist,
collaborative approach that restores the importance and value of context to an object’s
meaning and identity”264.
In response to the illegal flow of antiquities from source country to market country, the
role of international law is conceptualised as follows: International regulation of
antiquities aims to make up for the regulatory incapacity of source countries by shifting the
burden of control to market countries and inducing them to control inflows of
antiquities265. Securing cooperation of market countries through enactment and
enforcement of import controls seems to have been a significant strategy under the
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO 1970). Based on the negotiating
stance of the United States at the UNESCO 1970 Convention, the position of source
countries may be summed up as follows:
1. Selective, rather than blank check system of export/import controls
2. Non-retroactivity with the aim of protecting existing collections of museums and
other collectors
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3. Reciprocity by source countries through better domestic protection and
conservation measures and openness to cultural exchange agreements
Fitz Gibbon recalls the general rule in private international law with respect to foreign
transactions between individuals or corporations, whereby the court may choose either
to make its own characterization or follow the characterization under the source
country’s laws. Given the nature of the antiquities market whereby “thieves and
smugglers tend to move cultural property to countries with a weak law enforcement
capacity and where the tainted title can be laundered through expiration of the limitation
periods required for adverse possession, prescription or estoppel, or the norms
protecting bona fide purchasers”, Chechi tries to assess the implications of private
international law in operation. To begin with, he points out that “restitution claims are
normally directed to the courts in the place where the objects are found”, however, such
rules are only rarely designed with cultural goods in mind and in any case vary across
jurisdictions. Lex rei sitae or the principle whereby title is determined under the laws of
the country where the last transaction took place is the principle generally used by
national courts to decide such claims, according to Chechi. However, Chechi argues that
whether such a transaction has taken place in a civil law jurisdiction (where the possessor
is assumed to hold title in good faith) or in a common law jurisdiction (where title of
stolen property cannot be transferred), as well as the statutes of limitation applicable,
greatly influence outcomes of legal action. Chechi identifies lex originis as the most
favoured alternative principle in the literature to lex rei sitae, given the significance of
cultural goods to countries of origin. It is important to note that restitution or
repatriation is not guaranteed through the operation of lex originis and in cases where
the cultural artefact predates the coming into being of the state of origin, the principle’s
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application is contested. Chechi observes that “The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and
Directive 2014/60,64 which endorse the lex originis principle, have struck a balance
between the rights of original owners and of good faith possessors by providing for the
payment of compensation to the possessor that exercised the required due diligence at
the moment of acquisition”.
Another constraint which impedes international regulation of trade in cultural goods is
the non-applicability of foreign laws, writes Chechi. Here, whether the case for
restitution/repatriation is based on the patrimony law or the export control law is of
significance. For, while states are obligated to treat illegal removal of another state’s
heritage as theft, they are not required to enforce the export control laws of another
state.
Derek Fincham discussed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) as a way of
overcoming this last barrier to international cooperation. Since the US is a major market
country, Fincham believes MLATs to be an effective tool for repatriation efforts,
particularly through the modality of forfeiture actions. Defining forfeiture as an action
where “the offence is primarily attached to the thing”, rather than the offender, Fincham
adds that “forfeiture actions have been used extensively by in the United States in
actions brought by US prosecutors”. Fincham makes some further important points
about the implications of deploying MLATs for cooperation in the realm of cultural
heritage:
1. Forfeiture actions prioritise repatriation over criminal prosecution of individuals.
Thus, they privilege the regulatory approach over criminalisation.
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2. They incentivise museums to step up their due diligence efforts prior to acquiring
objects. Equally, as financially well-endowed institutions, they hold museums
accountable for creating demand for smuggled art and antiquities.
3. Excessive reliance on these treaties by source nations is disincentivised due to the
possibility of backlash from affected constituencies and the burden imposed on
agencies directly involved in the cooperative effort in market nations.
4. Lawyers specialising in cultural heritage may increase their reliance on existing
tools rather than attempting to develop new laws.
Fincham discusses law as a subset of regulation in the case of the global heritage market.
He states that “Social norms regulate behaviour when the law is ineffective—and
because the antiquities trade works hard at every turn to evade scrutiny, these norms
serve as de facto regulation of the sale of antiquities in many cases”266.
Restitution and repatriation constitute a telling example of norm emergence and
adoption in international society and its eventual reflection in international law. In what
follows, I trace through history the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations
Security Council Resolutions which address this issue as a way of documenting the
evolution of this norm.
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
In 1961, The international Court of Justice said the following, with reference to a series of
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly267:
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General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative
value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the
existence of a rule, or the emergence of an opinio juris.
Accordingly, the emergence and evolution of an opinion juris or norm supportive of
restitution and repatriation of cultural property to their places of origin is seen through a
series of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions discussed below, since the
UNESCO Convention of 1970.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3026, 1972268


Expressed a fear that “the world may be impoverished by succumbing to
uniformity and monotony in modes of life”



Considered that scientific and technological advancement could both be
supportive off and at odds with preservation of cultural values



Urged states to use their national development plans as an instrument to tackle
associated risks

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2148, 1973269


Clarified that an emphasis on preserving national and local cultures should not
lead to “withdrawal of various cultures into themselves”
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Affirmed the right of states to formulate laws and policies for heritage protection
as a sovereign right” and recognised cultural exchanges in accordance with these
laws as conducive to protection



Embraced a living conception of culture by encouraging that heritage
conservation efforts be linked to development policies

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3187, 1973270


Taking reference to UNESCO 1970, places a “special obligation” on countries
which have come to possess art and cultural objects from other territories by
virtue of imperial occupation to undertake prompt restitution of the objects



Emphasizes the role of cultural understanding – one’s own and others – in
supporting broader international cooperation

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3391, 1975271


Invited “Member States to ratify the Convention on the |Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, adopted by the general conference of the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organisation in 1970”.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/39 and 31/40, 1976272
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Reiterated the link between cooperation on protecting cultural values with
positive outcomes for international peace and security and economic
development



Referred to Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights, reintroducing the discourse of human rights in the cultural domain



Renewed calls for restitution of plundered art and cultural objects to countries of
origin

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/18, 1977273


Urged member states to take steps towards preventing illicit traffic in cultural
objects, in particular items from countries formerly under colonial occupation and
foreign domination

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/50, 1978274


Mentions establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the
Return of Cultural Property to its Counties of Origin or its Restitution in case of
Illegal Appropriation as a promising step

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/34, 1983275
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Expressed concern over the phenomenon of clandestine excavations on account
of which countries and the world at large were sustaining heavy losses to cultural
heritage



Highlighted “the importance of inventories as an essential tool for the
understanding and protection of cultural property and for the identification of
dispersed heritage and as a contribution to the advancement of scientific and
artistic knowledge and intercultural communication”.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/19, 1985276


Drew attention to underwater cultural heritage and called on States with
historical and cultural links to these treasures to cooperate towards their recovery
in accordance with international law



Pointed out the need for restitution of cultural objects to be accompanied by
training of personnel for their maintenance

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 42/7, 1987277


Recommended closer monitoring of licenced excavations by archaeologists



Recommended that museums should be required to maintain inventories of
cultural items not only on display but also in storage

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/10, 1991
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Highlighted the importance of deploying mass media and educational institutions
to create greater awareness about progress on return and restitution of cultural
property278

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/190, 1999279


In addition to the on-going illicit traffic in cultural property, drew attention to “the
loss, destruction, damage, removal, theft, pillage or misappropriation of and any
acts of vandalism directed against cultural property in areas of armed conflict and
territories that are occupied.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/97, 2001280


Lauded the creation of International Fund for the Return of Cultural Property to
its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, to mark the
thirtieth anniversary of UNESCO 1970

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/17, 2003281


Mentions “adoption of the International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural
Property by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization on 16 November 1999” as a welcome step and urges
implementation of the code.
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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/52, 2006282


Acknowledged the scope of application of the Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and their Property (adopted by UN in December 2004) to the
protection of cultural heritage and appeals for member state cooperation to
ensure the Convention comes into force



Recognised UNESCO’s efforts towards “promotion of bilateral negotiations, for
the return or restitution of cultural property, the preparation of inventories of
movable cultural property and the implementation of the Object-ID standard
related thereto, as well as for the reduction of illicit traffic in cultural property and
the dissemination of information to the public”



Mentioned the Cultural heritage laws database launched by UNESCO in 2005 and
urged linking of all existing databases, including through closer cooperation with
Interpol



Noted the inclusion of mediation and conciliation mechanisms in the revised
Statutes of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit
Appropriation

United Nations General Assembly Resolution A.67/L.34, 2012283


Lauded steps taken by UNESCO towards training people in source countries to
better equip them to protect cultural heritage while simultaneously engaging
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with representatives of the international art trade “in order to improve practices
and raise awareness in such areas as provenance investigations, ethics, restitution
procedures and knowledge of the international legal framework”.


Implicitly recognised the connection between the illicit trade in cultural objects
and other organised crime in calling for cooperation with United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

African nations have taken the lead in sponsoring these UNGA resolutions. Meanwhile
many African states have not ratified UNESCO 1970, and fewer still have ratified
UNIDROIT 1995 (out of 54 nations, 22 have ratified and 6 accepted UNESCO 1970,
whereas only 11 African nations are thus far contracting states for UNIDROIT 1995).
However, because conventions carry greater weight than resolutions (as representing
emerging opinio juris) in international law, we may have a skewed impression of the will
of the international community.
Snidal and Abbott term those “states (and other actors) that have worked to obtain
commitments from others, often in the face of strong resistance”, as demandeurs. They
estimate that “Demandeurs should seek hard legalization (1) when the likelihood of
opportunism and its costs are high, and noncompliance is difficult to detect; (2) when
they wish to limit participation to those strongly committed to an agreement; and (3)
when executive officials in other states have preferences compatible with those of the
demandeurs, but other elites within those states have divergent preferences. Finally,
demandeurs should place greatest reliance on commitments by states that participate
actively in legal regimes and have strong legal institutions, professions, and traditions.”
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In the case of source countries desiring repatriation and restitution of their cultural
goods from market countries, one observes that most of these conditions apply. Interest
groups in market countries have been seen to repeatedly contrive justifications and
maintain a culture of secrecy as well as a great degree of opportunism by exploiting the
conditions which fuel illicit excavation and export from source countries. Source
countries desire strong commitment on part of market countries as transfer of
ownership of cultural property can be a fraught and drawn out process and there is room
for debate about which items are of great cultural and national significance. In this case,
not the demandeurs but the market countries themselves seek similar levels of
commitment from other market countries as the game theory framework discussed
previously suggests. In market countries there is usually a significant and vocal section of
elite opinion which favours the purported educational needs and cultural enrichment of
domestic constituents and thereby opposes restitution and repatriation. Lastly, the
market countries have strong legal professions and traditions themselves. Yet, when
seeking cooperation on restitution and repatriation of heritage, we find that African
states as demandeurs have not chosen to Ratify UNESCO 1970 and UNIDROIT 1995.
Instead, they have repeatedly used the forum of United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions to foster a normative consensus.
Such a stance by African and other third world states could be attributed to a number of
reasons. Through legalisation, African states become enmeshed with powerful non-state
actors in market countries, namely museums and collectors, who are politically
unaccountable and maintain a culture of secrecy. Legalisation also creates certain
obligations for source countries which they may not have a capacity to fully meet. Lastly,
whether through the non-aligned movement during the cold war or the inclusion of
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second generation rights in the human rights paradigm, or indeed as the above UNGA
resolutions demonstrate, in case of heritage conservation, third world states have
demonstrated a preference for normative evolution as a driver of change in the
international system. My assessment lends credence to Amitav Acharya’s view that “the
so-called Third World has been a maker of international rules and norms”284.
Archarya adds that the impact of third world states on the international system
“include(s) significant modifications to, and adaptations of, European norms of
sovereignty on the basis of preexisting local beliefs and practices, as well as the
creation of new rules in the local context and exporting them to the wider
regional and global levels to influence and shape relations within the Third World
and between the Third World and the West”. The discourse of repatriation of
cultural heritage and the demonstrated preference for norm-based cooperation over
legalisation exemplify such a contribution of third world states.
Heritage and Just War
This section explores how the case study of heritage protection allows us to reassess and
reimagine a fundamental building block of international law – particularly international
humanitarian law and international criminal law – namely, Just War. Following two major
motivations behind this study, the principles of Just War are first gleaned from various
non-western traditions. Thereafter, Daniel Brunstetter’s framework built on the pillars of
necessity tension, civilizational paradox and magnanimity principle is applied to refocus
the discussion on destruction of cultural heritage in the context of war.
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The analysis here is inspired by the two fold understanding that while the relevance of
religious doctrine to the international normative framework governing just war is well
established, there is an inadequate foundation of analysis spanning a spectrum of
religions assessing their respective positions on key individual aspects of cause of war
and its conduct, to support the desired international normative project. There is a
multitude of desirable human goals and social aspirations across religions and within the
same religion across time, and varying degrees of specification as to the proper means to
achieve these. As a result, there is a genuine lack of a multi/inter-civilizational
understanding of Just War and the widely held belief that, as it stands, the Just War
Theory is largely based on relevant ideas in Christianity. To address this limitation,
interpretations of Just War in other religious traditions – Manu, Sun Tzu and Shia and
Sunni Islam are discussed. I argue that this, more broad-based approach to
conceptualizing Just War Theory allows the evolution of International Criminal Law to be
more sensitive to civilizational diversity, more responsive to changing nature of warfare
and ultimately, a more effective instrument in promoting just peace.
Rescuing Just War from Christian-centricity
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles states that the Tribunal constituted under the terms
of the treaty aims to vindicate the “validity of international morality”. The Charter of the
International Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg counted murder, ill-treatment, or
deportation of civilians in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war;
killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of
municipalities and devastation not militarily necessary as constituting war crimes. The
Geneva Conventions separately identified breaches corresponding to the wounded on
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land and sea, prisoners of war and civilians. The Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol
I added to the list to include medical experimentation; making civilians and non-defended
localities the object or inevitable victims of attack; the perfidious use of the Red Cross or
Red Crescent emblem; transfer of an occupying power of parts of its population to
occupied territory; unjustifiable delays in repatriation of POWs; apartheid; attack on
historic monuments; and depriving protected persons of a fair trial as well as making it
incumbent on States to prosecute or assist in prosecuting persons responsible for grave
breaches. In-keeping with the changing nature of conflict, Additional Protocol II set out
rules addressing the growing trend towards intrastate conflicts.
The laws of war as we know them today may have been formalised in response to a
combination of factors such as socio-political developments in the West across the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the emerging logic of the military industrial
complex and evolution in the technologies of war making. However thinking about the
role of war in intercivilizational and interstate relations predates this process of
formalization by far. In fact, much of this thinking has happened in the context of
religious pronouncements on broader issues of justice, peace and fairness.
The fact that much codification of International Criminal Law based itself upon provisions
in the United Nations Charter, which itself was a response to regional and contextspecific events, led to a progressive overshadowing of other stakeholders and their
perspectives. To the extent that Custom is one of the sources of International Law then,
revisiting Just War Theory to incorporate understandings from diverse religious and
cultural traditions is a project directed at broadening the customary base and extending
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the customary lineage of International Criminal Law, in time and across civilizational
boundaries.
While the relevance of religious doctrine to the international normative framework
governing Just War is well established, there is an inadequate foundation of analysis
spanning a spectrum of religions assessing their respective positions on key individual
aspects of cause of war and its conduct, to support the desired international normative
project. Academic debate has largely converged on whether religious texts justify
violence or are mere subterfuge to mask other, more worldly, motives and further,
whether believers of certain religions are more prone to resort to use of force than
others285. Existing scholarly treatment has largely cast this as an issue of subjective
textual interpretation. This obscures the fact that there is a multitude of desirable human
goals and social aspirations across religions and within the same religion across time, and
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varying degrees of specification as to the proper means to achieve these. As a result,
there is a genuine lack of a multi/inter-civilizational understanding of Just War and the
widely held belief that, as it stands, the Just War Theory is largely based on relevant ideas
in Christianity.
In the following sections, I start by reviewing thinkers within Christianity around whose
ideas Just War Theory has developed. Thereafter, interpretations of Just War in other
religious traditions – Manu, Sun Tzu and Shia and Sunni Islam are discussed. I argue that
this, more broad-based approach to conceptualizing Just War Theory allows the
evolution of International Criminal Law to be more sensitive to civilizational diversity,
more responsive to changing nature of warfare and ultimately, a more effective
instrument in promoting just peace.

Augustine and Aquinas
As a bishop in North Africa, Saint Augustine's writing explores various dimensions of faith
but much of it has been interpreted by later commentators as relevant to the principles
of Just War. An obvious and oft quoted idea in Augustine is that war is just under certain
circumstances. But his main stipulation is that war may be waged only by "the good". The
good in his conception are those who are guided by supreme reason (divine law) rather
than temporal law (prevailing law at any given time). Augustine clearly believes that the
good are not motivated by self-defense. Rather, killing an enemy is justified only in
defense of others and in situations where virtue and other qualities of the soul are at risk
at the hands of wrongdoers.
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"Let necessity slay the warring foe, not your will286".
As long as war is waged by those vested with legitimate authority to do so (and not
everyone is), means adopted by them in order to win do not matter. Augustine insists
however that the unarmed and innocent should under no circumstances be subjected to
cruelty. To him, this was an important quality separating the Christian from the barbarian.
In letter 189 to Boniface Augustine says:
"As violence is returned to one who rebels and resists, so should mercy be to one who has
been conquered or captured, especially when there is no fear of a disturbance of peace."

But closer reading suggests that Augustine's main interest is in the weaknesses of human
character that supply the basis for war in the first place - pride, malice, hatred. Even as he
acknowledges the inevitability of war, he remains skeptical of ensuing victories. To
Augustine, the pursuit of peace through war is justifiable merely in a (lesser) human
sphere but the human propensity to inordinately value what he terms "goods of the
earthly city", ultimately leads to a vicious cycle of misery. In City of God Book XIX Chapter
twelve he states:
"...pride imitates God in a distorted way. It hates equality with partners under God, but
wants to impose its own domination upon its partners in place of God. Consequently, it
hates the just peace of God and loves its own iniquitous peace."
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This prognosis of human nature, together with the fact that scholars have failed to
identify a coherent body of thought on just war in Augustine (simply basing themselves
on disparate ideas pieced together), necessitates reconceptualization of Augustine's
philosophy. It appears that Augustine's point of departure is not Just War but Just
Peace.
If the earthy realm followed the laws of God rather than temporal laws which are always
subject to change, the need for war would never arise. But when barbarians threaten
virtue in others, the good must not stand idly by but defend those in need. The following
lines from Letter 229 to Darius suggest that Augustine does acknowledge means of
rectifying wrongs short of use of force:
"Preventing war through persuasion and seeking or attaining peace through peaceful
means rather than through war are more glorious things than slaying men with the sword."
Moreover, the end goal of victory does not guarantee that peace will permanently
prevail; indeed man's pride will ensure this does not happen. In addition, he finds the
origins of political authority itself in sin. Thus the same authority that must be counted on
to bring wrongdoers to justice, cannot be trusted to establish long-term peace.
In their editorial comments on select passages from Augustine, Reichberg et al argue
that his views on the use of force were a response to a contemporary rebellion in the
Church staged by the Donatists287. This assessment allows us to pinpoint deviations from
the path of (Christian) virtue as the prime, and perhaps only, justification for the use of
force to be found in Augustine. In sum, war is caused by human proclivity to stray from
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the path of virtue and the order that results when force is applied being always short of
the perfect just peace, will ultimately produce conditions fueling war again. The limits on
use of force in Augustine are the possibility of persuasion, legitimate authority and
defense of the innocent.
Thomas Aquinas explores war in the context of peace and peace with reference to
justice. In his view, inner peace prevails when there is a “union of the appetite’s
inclinations” i.e. when the heart is free of desires and wants. And peace between
individuals prevails when they are in concord as to what is desirable in accordance with
Charity, the preeminent Christian virtue.
“Peace is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice removes obstacles to peace: but it
is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature causes peace.”
When it comes to war, Aquinas appears more favorably disposed to self defense as
reasonable grounds for use of force when compared with Augustine. As regards the
manner of conducting war, he argues that ambushing the enemy is acceptable. While
deception by falsely representing ones intentions is illicit, concealing them from the
enemy is not.
In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas justifies war in these words:
“Even those who seek war and dissention, desire nothing but peace, which they deem
themselves not to have. For (…) there is no peace when a man concords with another man
counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this
concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing
is contrary to their will.”
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More broadly, Aquinas seems to be interested in exploring the human quest for a more
perfect peace and specifying the conditions that legitimize wielding of political power in
general, making his ideas applicable in a context of nonconventional conflict and civil
wars as well.
Where does Aquinas place the limits on war? The answer can only be gauged from his
discussion on peace in general as he does not articulate his own views but simply
synthesizes and sometimes refutes and modifies those of theologians that came before
him. A plausible reading would be that the basis for war is removed when the virtue of
Charity is attained so that inner harmony is enjoyed and where there is agreement on
what the ultimately desirable social goods are so that justice, and thereby
outer/communal peace, prevails.
Manu
The Hindu conception of War and its place in society evolved amid the countervailing
influences of the idealism in epics such as the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the realism of
political texts such as the Arthashastra and the proximity to pacifist streaks in Jainism
and Buddhism. Kaushik Roy identifies the concept of Dharmayuddha as the counterpart
of Just War in Hinduism288:
Dharmayuddha depends on the ends (i.e. the objectives) of war. Any war undertaken
against injustice becomes a dharmayuddha. (…) organized violence applied in accordance
with certain codes and customs.
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Manu is the legendary originator of the Hindu/Sanskrit legal code and his writing has
been acknowledged by present day scholars and commentators as the place where the
notion of war crimes first coherently appeared.
Manu discusses war in the context of a much broader discussion on the nature of
kingship, the duties associated with it, moral authority of kings and their conduct. In the
first place, the king is to ensure that justice prevails and the (hierarchical) social order
maintained. He expounds at length on defensive measures to be put in place by a king to
preserve territorial integrity. Once this has been done, the more justly the king rules over
his own domain, the higher will be the reputational gains he makes abroad.
Careful reading reveals that Manu envisages the role of warfare as a way for the just and
righteous king to amass more resources and enrich his kingdom. Manu's equivalent of
the "system" in the Realist school of International Relations is a number of kingdoms,
some ruled by more just kings than others and varying in wealth and prestige. Thus the
logic of warfare flows from self-preservation and when the opportunity presents itself,
self-aggrandizement and enrichment289:
"Let the king consider as hostile his immediate neighbor (...), as friendly the immediate
neighbor of his foe, and as neutral (the king) beyond these two."
Roy notes that “one of the characteristics of dharmayuddha is its defensive nature”. It is
crucial, however, to distinguish between defensive tactics and defensive intentions.
Indeed, the King being duty bound to increase his power and prestige through conquest,
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clearly suggests that there is no recognition of self-defense as the sole just cause for
waging war in this tradition.
Certain caveats do indeed apply to this general position on the right of kings to engage in
warfare.
Firstly, establishment of a just, prosperous and secure internal order precedes external
military engagement.
"When the king knows that at some future time his superiority is certain, and at the present
time he will suffer little injury, then let him have recourse to peaceful measures. But when
he thinks all his subjects to be exceedingly contented, and that he himself is most exalted,
then let him make war."
Secondly, even when dealing with rival kingdoms, warfare is one of many instruments of
statecraft, diplomacy being the most important among them.
"For the ambassador alone makes allies and separates allies; the ambassador transacts that
business by which kings are disunited or not. Having learnt exactly (from his ambassador)
the designs of the foreign king, let (the king) take such measures that he does not bring evil
on himself."
This is also indicative of there being a notion of last resort in Manu. Elsewhere he says:
“He should try to conquer his foes by conciliation, by (well-applied) gifts, and by creating
dissention, used either separately or conjointly, never by fighting (if it can be avoided). For
when two (princes) fight, victory and defeat in battle are, as experience teaches uncertain;
let him therefore avoid an engagement.”
And thirdly, all wars must be conducted in accordance with certain laws.
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"Thus has been declared the blameless, primeval law for warriors; from this law a Kshatriya
must not depart, when he strikes his foes in battle."
His main injunctions in terms of proper war-time conduct are avoiding harm to the
innocent and unarmed, humane treatment of wounded and captured warriors and bans
on use of certain kinds of weaponry. Manu does not explicitly discuss "legitimate
authority", assuming that it is vested in the king; instead he provides specifications as to
the character of such a king.
“By him who is pure and faithful to his promise, who acts according to the Institutes
(injunctions) of sacred law, who has good assistants and is wise, punishment can be justly
inflicted.”
Thus punishment being key to orderly human behavior and essential to maintaining
internal and external order, the same variable, namely the king’s character, legitimizes
use of force within the domain and outside.
Manu’s teaching as regards the post bellum order, directs the victors to endeavor to
restore equilibrium of justice and friendly relations with vanquished former adversaries.
“When he has gained victory, (…) having fully ascertained the wishes of all the
(conquered), let him place a relative of the vanquished ruler on the throne, and let him
impose his conditions,”
While Manu earlier justifies waging of war to extract bounties from neighboring
kingdoms, in his post bellum scenario, the victorious king is ever mindful to balance this
against the need to turn former foes into future allies:
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“By gaining gold and land a king grows not so much in strength as by obtaining a firm
friend, who, though weak, may become powerful in the future”.
Another eminent strategist in this tradition is Kautilya, an influential advisor to King
Chandragupta of the Maurya dynasty (around 300 BC). Kautilya’s mandala theory
anticipates the anarchical State system at the heart of structural realism (and commonly
attributed to Hobbesian state of nature). Explaining this theory, Roy writes:
Kautilya portrays interstate relations as a circle composed of various kingdoms. This is
known as the mandala theory. The manadala is full of disorder, chaos and anarchy (…) the
only security in such a dangerous, fluid situation is power. (…) Hence struggle between the
various kingdoms is inevitable.

Sun Tzu
Sun Tzu delves deeper into the art and science of warfare rather than setting out a
detailed context in which aggression is justified. The wise general is vested with almost
limitless freedom when it comes to strategy and tactics. He stands firmly in favor of
deception and deployment of overwhelming force against the opponent, indeed,
repeatedly advocating them through various metaphors as vital to success in battle.
Foraging on resources in hostile territory and disrupting civilian life to drain the
adversary's morale are also deemed permissible.
Broadly speaking, Sun Tzu's point of departure is moral law which, he says, causes people
to be in complete accord with the ruler and such a ruler always has the upper hand when
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it comes to warfare. However the principles of limited objectives and humane treatment
of enemy combatants and spies may also be gleaned in his writing290:
"There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. (...) In war,
then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns."
"The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. (...) The enemy's spies who have
come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably
housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service."
As noted above however, Sun Tzu is less categorical on the place of war in the general
conduct of political affairs. Perhaps his most frequently cited adage however is that:
"...in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas
he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory."
This could simply mean that measures should be taken to ascertain that the enemy is in a
weaker position compared to the aggressor at the time of attack. An alternative
interpretation, however, raises the more fundamental question as to whether war should
be engaged in at all once underlying objectives have been attained.
Shia and Sunni Islam
Feirahi writes that “in Islamic jurisprudence, war is equal to jihad, which is one of the 10
secondary rules of Islam. However it should be noted that one must necessarily
distinguish between the Qur’anic and jurisprudential usages of “jihad”. In most cases in
the Qur’an, jihad means “striving” in the way of God; in its jurisprudential usage,

290

Sun Tzu on the Art of War, Translated from Chinese by Lionel Giles, Allandale Online Publishing, 2000
https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf
Accessed June 23, 2020

180

however, jihad refers to “war” …291” Sonbol maintains the same distinction referring to
the first sense as Jihad and the terming the second, narrower, interpretation as
“Qatilu”292. She also identifies protection of life and human dignity and protecting the
helpless as two main overriding concerns in Islam. Seeking to clarify the term Jihad,
Mahmud Mamdani offers another distinction: “Scholars distinguish between two broad
traditions of jihad: jihad Akbar (the greater jihad) and jihad Asgar (the lesser jihad), The
greater jihad, it is said, is a struggle against weaknesses of self; it is about how to live and
attain piety in a contaminated world, The lesser jihad, in contrast, is about selfpreservation and self-defense; more externally directed, it is the source of Islamic notions
of what Christians call "just war"293.”
In the specific context of Shiite Islam, Feirahi names “four sources of interpretation: the
Holy Qur’an, Tradition (Sunna), Intellect (Aql), and Unanimity (consensus)294.” Her
description of these as sources of interpretation suggests evolutionary growth as per
historical circumstance and room for application in accordance with context. On this
point too Sonbol is in agreement with the qualification that there are indeed “consistent
references and beliefs that represent essential points that appear in the writings of
important thinkers over the ages”. Within (and perhaps stemming from) this interpretive
flexibility, there appears a cleavage between thinkers who believe the qualifying
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secondary verses are central to reading the main injunctions on War and those that
maintain that the primary verses overrule secondary qualifications.
The general principle guiding all followers is that use of force is justified when there is
persecution of Muslims, in particular displacement and attacks on holy sites. But beyond
this first point of departure, a spectrum of opinion exists on defensive versus offensive
jihad. On this point Feirahi writes: “The classic Islamic jurisprudence, whether Shiite or
Sunnite, classifies jihad on two levels: offensive and defensive. In this classical approach,
the main meaning of jihad is offensive jihad, which is an obligatory act for any Muslim.
Particularly among Sunnites, it is believed that the Qur’anic verses on jihad nullified
(nasikh) the Qur’anic verses on peace…”
The quotes below from two prominent jurisprudents starkly convey this difference of
opinion:
“It is our obligation to commence war on them (non-believers), though they may not intend
to commence a war on us. Because Allah has made it an obligation on us to kill the
unbelievers, so nobody (Lawful or Unlawful Governors) would be in a position to suspend
this rule, so that all the people would say that there is no god but Allah.295”
“But if Muslims are attacked by the enemy and the religion or lives of Muslims are in danger,
in such a case Jihad and defence is a religious duty even under an unjust ruler, of course not
as an offensive Jihad, but as one defending the lives of Islam and Muslims.296”
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The above quotes also allude to the question of legitimate authority and herein lies the
main difference between Shiite and Sunni Islam. In Shiite Islam, only the infallible Imam is
vested with the authority to declare war. The fact that the twelfth infallible Imam is in
occultation, coupled with the responsibility of believers in Islam to engage in jihad
discussed above, may lead us to conclude that defensive jihad has the upper hand in
Shiite Islam. This reading also finds resonance in the words297 of the First infallible Imam,
Ali, who lived in the seventh century:
Peace is closer to salvation and is more beneficial up to the moment that Islam is not in peril.
Analysis
Based on review of principles embedded in the traditions discussed above, one can
plausibly conclude that Just War Theory embraces their understanding of conduct during
war more broadly than it does the competing conceptions of just cause for war. Both are
separately discussed below and implications for relevant aspects of International
Criminal Law assessed in each case.
The two pillars of Jus in Bello – Discrimination and Proportionality – find mention in all of
the traditions studied but an exact overlap of scope and rationale is not in evidence. All
religious tenets forbid attacks on the unarmed. There is general agreement that humane
treatment must be extended to captured enemy combatants. However, in Sun Tzu, this
is inspired not by a humanitarian logic but as an extension of strategy to the extent that
it is justified for purposes of gathering information about the enemy. As regards
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proportionality, it has been noted above that disruption of civilian life is acceptable in
Sun Tzu as a means to gain the psychological edge over the adversary. Hindu philosophy
legitimizes attack on all assets in enemy territory, although it equally holds the victor
responsible for restoring order to defeated regions and populations post bellum.
The table below summarises the broad orientation to offensive and defensive war in the
traditions considered and juxtaposes them against the locus of legitimacy.

Legitimacy vested in
individuals

Offensive War

Defensive War

Augustine

Aquinas

Manu

Shia Islam

Sun Tzu
Sunni Islam

Legitimacy derived from
text

In Sunni Islam, there is consensus around the idea that enemies of Islam and its
homelands should be opposed and by violent means if necessary. Less widely shared but
certainly prevalent is the belief that offensive jihad may be waged against nonbelievers.
In the table above it is therefore classified under traditions which legitimise Defensive
War. In Shia Islam too we find this justification for defensive war when Islam and its
believers are in jeopardy but with the additional requirement that resort to violence must
be certified by the Imam (in occultation). This is unlike in Sunni Islam where only the
message contained in religious texts matters.
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Manu and Sun Tzu are classified under offensive war in the table simply because both
speak of waging war necessarily from a position of strength. The fact that the Hindu king
is permitted to wage war to augment the resources of his kingdom suggests that
unprovoked aggression is not ruled out. It is noteworthy however, that this decision
rests with the just king and involves the exercise of the wisdom, discretion and sense of
fairness that he embodies. Sun Tzu also accords significant weight to the wise general’s
assessment of when and for what reasons resorting to force is acceptable. The fact that
both these traditions make room for offensive war in no way means, however, that war
is inevitable. They lay great emphasis on the role of diplomacy and other instruments of
statecraft in ensuring harmonious interstate relations.
To conclude, it is instructive to recall what the judgement of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal reads298:
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of States
which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice
applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.
The analysis above shows that there are indeed divergent perceptions of offensive and
defensive war not fully captured in the Just War Theory as it has been understood and
which thereby remain unrepresented in International Criminal Law despite their
significance in real world conflict scenarios. We also find that proportionality is not
uniformly defined across all traditions. As battlefields of the future evolve to include, for
instance, cyber warfare, this finding can help us take more effective measures to ensure
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emerging risks to civilian life are insured against. One of the traditions reviewed above
upholds the right to defend one’s home and territory based on interpretation of textual
sources. Seen from this perspective, it does not matter that the “invading force” terms
the intervention as humanitarian. Thus, a broader reconceptualization of Just War Theory
calls into question a one-size-fits-all approach to Humanitarian Intervention. Lastly, since
so much of the theological literature reviewed discusses justice and peace in relation to
each other, it provides valuable insights towards addressing a concern at the heart of
International Criminal Law: How to balance considerations of peace and reconciliation
with the aspiration of bringing wrongdoers to justice?
Just war, protecting heritage and intercivilisational dialogue
Brunstetter counts “scholasticism, neoscholasticism, canon law, chivalric code, holy war,
secular natural law, positive law, various types of reformism, and realism” among the
influences that have shaped the recurring themes constituting a body of thought that is
Just War299. He identifies three themes that are most pertinent to any discussion on the
threat of heritage destruction in war:
1. Necessity Tension which refers to “the dilemmas that military planners and
soldiers face when deciding whether to destroy or preserve cultural heritage sites
to advance toward victory300”
2. Civilisational paradox or the question as to “who defines which sites are
intrinsically valuable?301”
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3. Magnanimity Principle which refers to “the positive effects that could ensue in
choosing not to pursue the full range of acts the laws of war permit in times of
necessity302”
It is true that all cultures through history have partaken in plundering and spoliation of
each other’s heritage. However, a multi-civilisational perspective on Just War helps us
address some of the nuances of the problematic of protecting heritage amid conflict.
Firstly, the justifications for attacking the enemy’s heritage might be found to vary.
Brunstetter gives the example of the ancient Romans whose “worldview that clearly
distinguished between the civilized and the barbarians would impact how it fought its
wars, and what respect was ultimately paid to the cultural heritage of its enemies303”.
From the foregoing discussion about various traditions, one could extrapolate a
motivation of obtaining precious materials by plundering well-endowed heritage sites
from Manu’s justification of waging war to augment the resources of the kingdom/state.
Secondly, this analytical exercise helps us transcend the necessity tension – already
reflected in existing law in the form of “military necessity” and discussed in previous
chapters – and tap the Magnanimity Principle for it is promise. Sun Tzu’s emphasis on
limited objectives and non-disruption of civilian life serve as a boost to the magnanimity
principle. Manu’s insistence on a just ruler as a precondition for just war points towards a
magnanimous attitude towards the enemy’s culture and way of life.
Thirdly, it would be possible to glean a range of prescriptions on action to be taken
concerning destroyed or looted heritage after the end of hostilities – Manu, for instance,
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would advocate restitution if it enhances the prospects of converting a former adversary
into an ally.
Fourthly, it gives us grounds to argue against the destruction of heritage in the name of
religious prescription – in fact, use of force is justified in Shiite Islam if holy sites are
attacked. This aspect is particularly important considering the deliberate destruction of
heritage in recent years as part of the strategy of non-conventional warfare. Lastly, it
evades the risk of a hegemonic interpretation of the value of heritage by preventing the
views of a particular tradition from becoming generalized and predominant. In other
words, an intercivilisational dialogue of this kind enables us to arrive at a more balanced
and multi-faceted response to Brunstetter’s question “who decides which sites are
intrinsically valuable?”.
An intercivilisational dialogue is greatly instructive in determining what puts heritage at
risk during war and how heritage protection might be reimagined both during hostilities
and as part of post-conflict reconstruction.
Response -

Regulation/

Paradigm

restitution/

Criminalisation

Legalisation

repatriation
Game Theory

UNIDROIT 1995

UNESCO 1970

(setting out the

(concrete

terms for

obligations for

restitution and

state parties)
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repatriation with

UNIDROIT 1995

fair compensation)

(obligation and
delegation

Hague 1954 first

strengthened via

protocol

private

(prevention of

international law)

export during
occupation)

Hague 1954 second
protocol (enhanced
obligation and
precision building
on existing
instruments)

Human Security

Hague 1954 second
protocol
(introduction of
individual criminal
responsibility)
Al-Mahdi
judgement and
sentence
(protection in the
context of non-
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international armed
conflict)
Constructivism

United Nations

Hague 1954

General Assembly

(introduces

Resolutions (norm

internationalist

evolution and

paradigm in

development of

international legal

opinion juris)

discourse on
heritage
protection)
UNESCO 1972
(Concept and
language of World
Heritage)

In the last three chapters we applied the paradigms of Game Theory, Human Security and
Constructivism to international cooperation on protecting cultural patrimony. In this
chapter we evaluated major international legal responses as falling under the three
clusters of legalisation, criminalisation, and regulation, restitution and repatriation. To
conclude this chapter the above table brings the entire discussion together and shows
how approaches from International Relations and International Law working together
present international cooperation in a particular domain in different light, as a step
towards reconceptualising the role of law in international politics.
190

Bibliography
Abbott KW and Snidal D (2000), Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, Legalization and World Politics
Acharya A. (2011), Dialogue and Discovery: In search of International Relations Theories
beyond the West, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39(3)
Amineddoleh L. (2013), The Role of Museums in the Trade of Black Market cultural
heritage property, Art Antiquity and Law, Vol 17(3)
Brown MF (2014), The Possibilities and Perils of Heritage Management, in Sandis C (ed)
Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory and Practice, Open Book Publishers

191

Brunstetter DR (2018), A tale of two cities: the just war tradition and cultural heritage in
times of war, Global Intellectual History
Chechi A., When Private International Law meets Cultural Heritage Law: Problems and
Prospects, Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 19
Daniels B.I. and Al Quntar S (2016), Responses to the destruction of Syrian cultural
heritage: a critical review of current efforts, International Journal of Islamic Architecture,
Vol 5(2)
Ferahi D., Norms of War in Shia Islam in Popovsky, Reichberg, Turner (eds.), World
Religions and Norms of War (United Nations University Press 2009)
Fincham D (2013), Social Norms and Illicit Cultural Heritage,in Francesco Francioni, and
James Gordley (eds), Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law, OUP
Fitz Gibbon K. (2005), Chronology of Cultural property legislation in Fitz Gibbon K. (ed)
Who Owns the Past?, American Council for Cultural Property
Geoffrey R. Scott, Spoliation, Cultural Property, and Japan , 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L.
Hall S, Researching International Law, in McConville M and Chui WH (eds.) (2017),
Research Methods for Law, Edinburg University Press
Keane D. And Azarova V. (2013), UNESCO, Palestine and Archaeology in conflict, Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol 41, No 3
Mackenzie S (2011). Illicit deals in cultural objects as crimes of the powerful. Crime, Law
and Social Change, Springer Verlag, 56 (2)
Mamdani M., Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, American Anthropologist 104 (3)
192

Pearlstein W.G., Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts and Customs: The Decline and
Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in 1 Fitz Gibbon K. (2005), Chronology of Cultural property
legislation in Fitz Gibbon K. (ed) Who Owns the Past?, American Council for Cultural
Property
Reichberg, Syse and Begby (eds.) The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings
(Blackwell Publishing 2006)
Roy K, Norms of War in Hinduism in Reichberg, Syse and Begby (eds.) The Ethics of War:
Classic and Contemporary Readings (Blackwell Publishing 2006)
Schabas W. (2017), Al Mahdi has been convicted of a crime he did not commit, Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol 49
Sonbol A., Norms of War in Sunni Islam in Popovsky, Reichberg, Turner (eds.), World
Religions and Norms of War (United Nations University Press 2009)
Sterio M (2017), Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Destruction of Religious and
Historic Buildings: The Al Mahdi Case, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
Vol 49

193

Chapter 7
Conclusion
“Did an aggregate of entities boasting their sovereignty and insisting upon the
absoluteness of their particular interests constitute a societas where jus could reign?
Could the norms alleged to govern their conduct without benefit of authoritative
agencies of interpretation and enforcement, and subject therefore to literally
interminable debate between parties, be classified as law? Were they not rather a purely
tentative code, observed in fair weather, discarded in storm? Most lawyers seemed
content to leave the matter there.304”
This series of queries raised by P.E. Corbett over half a century ago fairly sum up the
inspiration behind conducting this study at the intersection of International Relations and
International Law.
The most significant contribution of this study lies in the innovative engagement it
orchestrates between the disciplines of International Relations and International Law as
its basic methodological orientation. This methodological enterprise is not directed at
finding common ground between the disciplines, as most existing literature has aimed
for, but at isolating those incompatibilities which illuminate and energise both disciplines.
The approach taken in analysing our case study from the lenses of rational choice/game
theory, human security and constructivism departs sharply from the inductive and
hierarchical approach to legal research but is instead selective and non-hierarchical. This
study has attempted to show that the clash between International Relations and

304

P.E. Corbett, Lawyers and the Law of Nations 1965, International Studies, vol. 7, 3: pp. 419-428

194

International Law research methods offers a new way forward for research by uniquely
accessing the potential of international law.
In a practical and practice sense, the trend of foreign ministries being increasingly staffed
by lawyers throws up questions about the distinctiveness of legal norms and the
emphasis laid on them over social, cultural, professional, religious and other types of
norms305, as well as of the influence of epistemic and practice communities more
generally. This phenomenon and its ramifications for conducting the business of the
international society enhances the urgency of a meaningful collaboration between
International Relations and International Law. On the opposite end, International
Relations scholars operating on their own have been able to show how norms with
domestic origins come to be internationalised. In conversation with International Legal
scholars however, they have been able to examine how norm entrepreneurs operating at
the international level can effect social and legal change in the domestic realm. Such an
understanding is crucial as we navigate a paradoxical contemporary milieu of strident
global social movements on the one hand and the inward pull of nationalism and
populism building on the disenchantment and discontents of globalisation on the other.
The choice of heritage protection as my case study sidesteps the tendency in
International Relations to arrive at generalisations and middle-range theorisation based
almost exclusively on studying issues of high politics. As succinctly stated by Finnemore
“the ‘null hypothesis’ in international law debates is that soft law does not matter or
does not matter as much as hard law”306. This study proves that soft law matters but
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transcends the very debate by investigating how the language of international law is
used and received by policy makers and those social groups whose interests are at stake.
By examining international legal responses in a particular domain (heritage protection
and cultural property) through the categories of legalisation, criminalisation and
regulation, the study also uncovers the picture that emerges when the very binary
between hard and soft law has been purposefully dismantled. In the case of restitution
and repatriation, for instance, we observed that both hard and soft law coexist. Further
we discovered that legalisation does not necessarily mean that there is no space left for
norm evolution in that particular domain. In fact, we found that states will often
appropriate the products of legalisation (conventions and treaties) for their normative
content rather than their binding force.
Another achievement of this study is that its methodological framework allows us to
transcend investigating international law purely for its form and function. The human
security approach to heritage protection enabled detection of trauma as a source of
conflict and contributed to an enhanced and extended conception of the security we aim
for. The constructivist paradigm cast aside the presumed neutrality of language when it
comes to articulating our moral positions and forming our world views. Going beyond
form and function to look into the normative ambitions and ramifications of international
law can make all the difference – either it will shore up structures of oppression or
unleash cooperation for common good.
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